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FOR THE GREATEST GOOD OF THE 
GREATEST NUMBER: MITIGATING 
CLIMATE CHANGE THROUGH CARBON 
DIOXIDE EMISSION REGULATION 
JANELL MIDDLETON*  
Conservation means the wise use of the earth . . . for the 
greatest good of the greatest number for the longest time.1 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Try to imagine a world where people do not have to see or ex-
perience the consequences of their actions for immense lengths of 
time. A world where children can eat candy and treats with every 
meal, and adults can live frivolously, consuming resources as if 
there were no tomorrow—a world where everyone has access to 
electricity and can thrive without a care. A time where everyone 
could turn a blind eye to the costs and wastes that accumulate be-
cause of their lifestyles and live with blissful ignorance to the in-
evitable problems or issues that are somewhere around the bend. 
While this world may seem foreign, in many ways it reflects a 
reality people throughout the world face. With environmental is-
sues on the rise throughout the world, along with the vast environ-
mental revolution this country has experienced, it is imperative 
that society continues to progress forward rather than turning a 
blind eye to the consequences of our actions, such as accumulating 
nuclear reactor wastes or greenhouse gas emissions.2 
                                                          
 2. See generally U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, Disposal of High-Level Nu-
clear Waste, http://www.gao.gov/key_issues/disposal_of_highlevel_nuclear_waste/issue_sum-
mary (last visited Feb. 2, 2015); see generally ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, Climate Change Science 
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From rivers catching on fire to killer smog events,3 this coun-
try has witnessed catastrophic disasters resulting from society’s 
actions. Despite these disastrous experiences, this country has 
taken steps forward assuring that these disasters will not happen 
again.4 Learning from these environmental adversities, Congress 
enacted legislation to adequately protect the environment, Ameri-
cans’ health, and general welfare.5 By choosing to take action, ra-
ther than remaining complacent and continuing to live in ignorant 
bliss, this country can continue moving forward in a more sustain-
able direction that ensures good health for both people and the en-
vironment. 
With climate change becoming a growing and complex issue, 
with the potential to initiate catastrophic disasters, governments 
and leaders from all over the world are acknowledging and ad-
dressing it as the existential problem threatening our existence.6 
Therefore, it is no surprise that the government here in the United 
States is taking action to combat it. The Obama Administration 
and the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) took drastic ac-
tion to propel this country’s efforts to reduce greenhouse gas emis-
                                                          
Overview, EPA http://www3.epa.gov/climatechange/science/overview.html (last updated Nov. 
4, 2015) (on June 22, 1969, the Cuyahoga River caught fire and ignited the desire and need to 
get the Clean Water Act passed). 
 3. See generally Jennifer Latson, The Burning River That Sparked a Revolution, 
TIME (June 22, 2015), http://time.com/3921976/cuyahoga-fire/; see generally Jen Carlson, 
Flashback: The City’s Killer Smog, GOTHAMIST (Nov. 24, 2009), http://gotham-
ist.com/2009/11/24/smog.php#photo-1 (within eleven years, starting in November of 1953, 
smog killed between 539 and 629 people in New York City). 
 4. See generally 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251–1274 (2015) [hereinafter Clean Water Act] 
(amended, became known as Clean Water Act in 1972); 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401–7431 (2015) [here-
inafter Clean Air Act] (Clean Air Act, enacted 1970). 
 5. See, e.g., Clean Air Act, supra note 4; Clean Water Act, supra note 4; 7 U.S.C. § 
136 (2015) (Federal Environmental Pesticide Control Act); 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4370m-12 (2015) 
(National Environmental Policy Act). 
 6. See Kurt Cobb, Climate Change is Our Grand Narrative Now, RESOURCE 
INSIGHTS (Nov. 29, 2015), http://resourceinsights.blogspot.com/2015/11/climate-is-our-grand-
narrative-now.html; see also COP21, Find Out More About COP21, 
http://www.cop21paris.org/about/cop21 (last visited Feb. 2, 2016).  
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sions by focusing on potential reductions of carbon dioxide emis-
sions.7 In doing so, the executive branch chose to focus chiefly on 
the electric power sector within the energy sector.8 This is primar-
ily because the electric power sector emits the most carbon dioxide 
emissions, in comparison to the transportation, industry, residen-
tial, commercial, and agricultural sectors.9 
The Clean Power Plan (“the Plan”) was published in the Fed-
eral Register on October 22, 2015, initiating a wave of lawsuits 
fueled by state opposition to the Plan.10 The majority of states are 
outraged by the new regulation.11 The opposing states specifically 
and primarily argue that the Plan infringes upon their sovereign 
                                                          
 7. See Standards of Performance for Greenhouse Gas Emissions From New, Modi-
fied, and Reconstructed Stationary Sources: Electric Utility Generating Units, 80 Fed. Reg. 
64, 510 (Oct. 23, 2015) [hereinafter Standards of Performance]; see also EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF 
THE PRESIDENT, THE PRESIDENT’S CLIMATE ACTION PLAN (June 2013), 
https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/image/president27sclimateactionplan.pdf.  
 8. See Presidential Memorandum -- Power Sector Carbon Pollution Standards to 
the Environmental Protection Agency (June 25, 2013), https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-
office/2013/06/25/presidential-memorandum-power-sector-carbon-pollution-standards. 
 9. See ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, Learn About Carbon Pollution From Power Plants, 
EPA, http://www.epa.gov/cleanpowerplan/learn-about-carbon-pollution-power-plants (last up-
dated July 27, 2016).  
 10. See Standards of Performance, supra note 7; see also E&E PUBL’G, LLC, The Fate 
of the Obama Administration’s Signature Climate Change Rule is in the Hands of the Courts, 
http://www.eenews.net/interactive/clean_power_plan/fact_sheets/legal (last visited Sept. 07, 
2016).  
 11. Primarily, the states are opposed to the existing stationary electric power plant 
standards for carbon dioxide emissions. See generally Application by 29 States and State Agen-
cies for Immediate Stay of Final Agency Action During Pendency of Petitions for Review, West 
Virginia v. EPA, 136 S. Ct. 1000 (2016) (No. 15A773). The Clean Power Plan has standards for 
both new and modified stationary electricity generating units, and for existing stationary elec-
tricity generating units, but this article will only be focusing on the existing stationary electric 
power plant standards for carbon dioxide emissions. See Carbon Pollution Emission Guidelines 
for Existing Stationary Sources: Electric Utility Generating Units, 80 Fed. Reg. 64, 662. For 
more information on the new and modified stationary electric power plant standards, please 
see Standards of Performance, supra note 7; see also EPA, Carbon Pollution Standards for 
New, Modified and Reconstructed Power Plants, http://www.epa.gov/cleanpowerplan/carbon-
pollution-standards-new-modified-and-reconstructed-power-plants (last updated Nov. 24, 
2015). 
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rights and authority to regulate their electricity-generating facili-
ties and general electricity services.12 
However, despite this power battle between the states and the 
EPA, there are vast benefits in the carbon dioxide emission reduc-
tions that could be achieved by the Clean Power Plan.13 With this 
in mind, and the idea that this country cannot continue along the 
path of least resistance by not regulating carbon dioxide emissions, 
one must ask whether the states should continue relying on electric 
facilities that meet consumers’ needs without regard for their 
harmful environmental impacts. Can the states have their cake 
and eat it too? 
In answering this question, Part II of this article describes the 
origins and progression of authority over time for both the states, 
in energy regulation, and the EPA, in the promulgation of the 
Clean Power Plan.14 Part III explores the current struggle between 
the states and the EPA for regulatory authority over power plants 
and endeavors to evaluate the strength of the power positions for 
each.15 Part IV looks beyond the current power struggle, offering 
guidance if the Plan is validated and offering a solution if the Plan 
is invalidated while still promoting the underlying purpose of the 
Plan: mitigating climate change through carbon dioxide emission 
regulation.16 Finally, Part V concludes with a declaration to act 
                                                          
 12. See State Petitioner’s Motion For Stay And For Expedited Consideration of Peti-
tion For Review, at 10–11 (2015) (No. 15-1363) (consolidated to West Virginia v. EPA, 136 S. 
Ct. 1000 (2016)); see also Joint Reply of West Virginia, et al., Oklahoma, et al., North Dakota, 
and Mississippi in Support of Motions for Stay and for Expedited Consideration, at 13–16 
(2015) (No. 15-1363) (consolidated to West Virginia v. EPA, 136 S. Ct. 1000 (2016)).  
 13. The Clean Power Plan aims to reduce carbon dioxide emissions from the power 
sector by 32 percent below 2005 levels of carbon dioxide emission in order to mitigate the im-
pacts of climate change. See ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, Fact Sheet: Overview of the Clean Power 
Plan Cutting Carbon Pollution from Power Plants, EPA, http://www.epa.gov/cleanpower-
plan/fact-sheet-overview-clean-power-plan (last updated Aug. 6, 2016). Climate change is rec-
ognized as one of the greatest environmental and public health challenges we face, due to its 
impacts on Americans, and people throughout the world, via “stronger storms [and] longer 
droughts, increased insurance premiums, food prices, and allergy” and asthma issues. See id. 
 14. See infra Part II. 
 15. See infra Part III. 
 16. See infra Part IV. 
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now.17 The states cannot always have it their way. They, as well as 
the EPA, are charged with a duty to protect the health and welfare 
of the people. Climate change will be confronted with carbon diox-
ide emission regulation, even if it means that society has to change 
its business–as–usual course of actions within the energy sector. 
II. TRADITIONAL SOURCES OF REGULATORY POWER 
The battle for regulatory authority of electricity services began 
as early as the eighteenth century. From borrowing some of the 
ideals of English common law when first attempting to regulate 
the distribution and access to electricity back in 1877,18 to state 
regulatory commissions experimenting with regulatory authority 
during the nineteenth century, energy regulation in the United 
States has been developed through an evolution of experience.19 
This evolution of experience began with predominant state regula-
tion of electricity services with the federal government finally get-
ting involved in 1920, via the Federal Water Power Act.20 There-
fore, the states were initially the labs of democracy and regulatory 
creation until the federal government felt it was necessary to in-
trude and assure that electricity services were fair.21 
This evolution of regulation, with authority unevenly split be-
tween the state and federal level, and the current status of regula-
tory authority, has further fueled the dispute between the states 
and the EPA. The source of both the states’ and EPA’s power to 
regulate will reveal the underlying federalism and power issues, 
which are crucial to the states’ argument that the Clean Power 
Plan is arbitrary and capricious and the EPA is overstepping its 
regulatory bounds. 
                                                          
 17. See infra Part V. 
 18. See Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113, 126 (1876) (citing Lord Chief Justice Hale, De 
Portibus Maris, 1 Harg. Law Tracts, 78).  
 19. See RICHARD F. HIRSH, THE ORIGINS OF DEREGULATION AND RESTRUCTURING IN 
THE AMERICAN ELECTRIC UTILITY SYSTEM, 21–22, 29–31 (1999). 
 20. See generally Water Power Act, 66 P.L. 369, 41 Stat. 1353 (1921). For further 
information and an overview in regards to electricity regulation, with it entirely originating in 
state regulation then progressing to federal regulation stepping in for interstate matters, see 
HIRSH, supra note 19, at 9–31 (Ch.1: The Utility Consensus and Initial Challenges it Faced).  
 21. See generally HIRSH, supra note 19. 
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A. State Authority and the Origin of Energy Regulation 
Ultimately, the states have a crucial source of power that orig-
inates from the Constitution.22 This source of state sovereignty is 
found within the Tenth Amendment.23 The Supreme Court has 
dealt with numerous cases that aid in defining what values or ben-
efits federalism provides, via protecting state governments.24 The 
three benefits typically provided by the protection of state govern-
ments are: “decreasing the likelihood of federal tyranny, enhancing 
democratic rule by providing government that is closer to the peo-
ple, and allowing states to be laboratories for new ideas.”25 Alt-
hough these are not the only benefits that federalism provides, 
these are typically the most commonly noted ones. 
As the Tenth Amendment has been interpreted and analyzed 
through numerous cases, an important principle of regulatory au-
thority has been established. Congress cannot impermissibly com-
mandeer state legislatures, agencies, or officials to implement fed-
eral mandates or regulations.26 Thus, it is unconstitutional for Con-
gress to conscript state governments or compel affirmative man-
dates coercively in an area that was traditionally regulated by the 
states.27 
The Tenth Amendment has also been interpreted to provide 
the states with a unique inherent power. This power is commonly 
                                                          
 22. U.S. CONST. amend. X. 
 23. Id. The Tenth Amendment provides, “The powers not delegated to the United 
States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respec-
tively, or to the people.” Id. 
 24. See, e.g., Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 919 (1997); Gregory v. Ashcroft, 
501 U.S. 452, 469 (1991); New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 155-56 (1992).  
 25. ERWIN CHEMERINKSY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 320 (4th 
ed. 2011). 
 26. New York, 505 U.S. at 166-67. 
 27. See Ashcroft, 501 U.S. at 460; see also Hodel v. Va. Surface Mining & Reclamation 
Ass’n, Inc., 452 U.S. 264, 288 (1981). 
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known as state police power.28 In the 1800s, the United States Su-
preme Court began resolving some conflicts over the power of the 
states versus the power of the federal government.29 In 1847, Chief 
Justice Taney explained the broad scope of the police power: 
But what are the police powers of a State? They are nothing 
more or less than the powers of government inherent in 
every sovereignty to the extent of its dominions. And 
whether a State passes a quarantine law, or a law to punish 
offenses, or to establish courts of justice, or requiring cer-
tain instruments to be recorded, or to regulate commerce 
within its own limits, in every case it exercises the same 
powers; that is to say, the power of sovereignty, the power 
to govern men and things within the limits of its dominion. 
It is by virtue of this power that it legislates; and its author-
ity to make regulations of commerce is as absolute as its 
powers to pass health laws, except insofar as it has been 
restricted by the Constitution of the United States.30 
By acknowledging the breadth of the police power as the power 
to govern, Chief Justice Taney set an early precedent for support-
ing state rights.31 In later cases the Supreme Court referred to the 
police power as the vast authority for states to do what was neces-
sary for the public good.32 By 1954 the Court indicated that terms 
like “public health, safety, . . . and welfare” were merely examples 
of the police power and were not intended to limit its scope.33 “Pub-
lic safety, public health, morality, peace and quiet, law and order—
these are some of the more conspicuous examples of the traditional 
application of the police power to municipal affairs. Yet they 
                                                          
 28. Chief Justice John Marshall was first credited with using this term in 1827 as a 
descriptive term to aid in categorizing state powers not delegated to the federal government. 
See generally Brown v. Maryland, 25 U.S. 419 (1827). 
 29. See generally Thurlow v. Massachusetts, 46 U.S. 504 (1897). 
 30. Id. at 583.  
 31. See generally id. 
 32. See Bacon v. Walker, 204 U.S. 311 (1907). 
 33. Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 31–32 (1954). 
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merely illustrate the scope of the power and do not delimit it.”34 As 
a result, while the Tenth Amendment leaves to the states what re-
sidual or left over powers that have not been reserved to the federal 
government, these leftovers are quite substantial. This power and 
sovereign right provides the states with broad authority to ensure 
the protection of public health, safety, and welfare of their respec-
tive citizens. 
Early on, the model of state regulation was greatly supported 
as the proper mechanism for overseeing and controlling the natu-
ral monopoly power of electric utilities.35 The police powers given 
to the states to be used “for the protection of the health, safety, 
morals, and general welfare” of their respective citizens has been 
supported and referenced by the Supreme Court since 1827, and is 
applicable to utilities providing electricity services today.36 
A unique feature of energy regulation in this country that sup-
ports states protecting its citizens’ general welfare, which is trace-
able to English common law,37 is that it is governed by a traditional 
“regulatory compact.”38 This compact was designed to ensure that 
reliable and consistent power supply was established for consum-
ers at prices that are both just and reasonable.39 As a general as-
sertion, one could simply state that utilities and their investors 
“are provided a level of stability in earnings and value less likely 
                                                          
 34. Id. 
 35. See Hirsh, supra note 19, at 15.  
 36. See id. 
 37. English law provided significant guidance for the United States in deciding how 
to regulate utilities. The idea of common businesses, or business serving the general public, 
became entrenched during the sixteenth century when the English government gave exclusive 
franchises to providers of certain services. These monopoly grants were given in exchange for 
the requirement that providers, here utilities, charge reasonable rates and offered those ser-
vices to all citizens without discrimination. See id. at 15–16. 
 38. See Johnathan A. Lesser & Leonardo R. Giacchino, Fundamentals of Energy Reg-
ulation, 35 ENERGY L. J. 219, 222 (2014). 
 39. See Jersey Cent. Power & Light Co. v. FERC, 810 F.2d 1168, 1189 (D.C. Cir. 
1987); see also Lincoln L. Davies, Power Forward: The Argument for a National RPS, 42 CONN. 
L. REV. 1339, 1392 (2010) (explaining the underlying purpose of regulatory compact as the 
need for “a consistent power supply at a reasonable price”). 
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to be attained” in the absence of regulation, and “in turn, ratepay-
ers are afforded universal, non-discriminatory service and protec-
tion from monopolistic profits.”40 This regulatory compact principle 
was approved of back in 1887, when the Supreme Court in Munn 
v. Illinois found that “when private property is ‘affected with a pub-
lic interest, it ceases to be juris privati only’” and thus is “subject 
to public regulation.”41 The Court also went on to establish two cri-
teria that aid in deciding whether a company’s services fall within 
this category of needing to be regulated.42 First, the business and 
service provided must be a necessity for society,43 and second, the 
business has to constitute a natural monopoly.44 Thus, as a quid 
pro quo for being provided a monopoly status within a particular 
vicinity for the provision of electricity services, utilities are subject 
to regulation by the states, via state commissions. The commis-
sions ensure that the utilities are prudent in their investments and 
revenues so that the most efficient and best service possible will be 
provided to their consumers.  
Even as federal regulation has developed in the area of energy 
regulation, Congress has hinted that the states still have discre-
tion and authority over deciding energy profiles or electricity gen-
eration compositions. For example, when Congress was creating 
                                                          
 40. Jersey Cent. Power & Light Co., 810 F.2d at 1189; see also Office of Pub. Util. 
Counsel v. Pub. Util. Comm’n, 104 S.W. 3d 225, 227–28 (Tex. App. 2003) (“[A]n electricity 
utility enters into a ‘regulatory compact’ with the public: in return for a monopoly over elec-
tricity service in a given area; the utility agrees to provide service to all requesting customers 
and to charge only the retail rates set by the [Regulatory] Commission.”). 
 41. 94 U.S. 113, 126, 130 (1876) (internal quotation by Lord Chief Justice Hale).  
 42. See id. at 127–28, 145.  
 43. Electricity services are extremely important for peoples’ health and general wel-
fare. This is illustrated by the high correlation of electricity with important and beneficial 
things like nutrition, literacy, population stability, life expectancy and infant survival; which 
can be found in the United Nations Human Development Index reports. Over time it has been 
established that a good indicator of a country’s level of development is its per capita use of 
electricity. See Jude Clemente, The Statistical Connection Between Electricity and Human De-
velopment, POWER, (Sept. 1, 2010), http://www.powermag.com/the-statistical-connection-be-
tween-electricity-and-human-development/; see generally Benjamin Attigah & Lucius Mayer-
Tasch, The Impact of Electricity Access on Economic Development: A Literature Review, 
PRODUSE (2013), http://www.produse.org/imglib/down-
loads/PRODUSE_study/PRODUSE%20Study_Literature%20Review.pdf. 
 44. See Munn, 94 U.S. at 127–28.  
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the Federal Water Power Act,45 one of the members of the House 
committee drafting the 1920 Act stated, “[w]e are earnestly trying 
not to infringe the rights of the States. If possible we want a bill 
that can not [sic] be defeated in the Supreme Court because of 
omissions, because of the lack of some provision that we should 
have put in the bill to safeguard the States.”46 When drafting the 
Federal Power Act, Congress attempted to carefully confine the 
Federal Power Commission, now the Federal Energy Regulatory 
Commission, to “only . . . fill a hiatus which might otherwise exist 
in the absence of state regulation,” and limited the Federal Power 
Commission to “regulating only in the absence of state regula-
tion.”47 Therefore, it is apparent that early on Congress was proac-
tive in seeking to highlight and preserve regulatory authority for 
the states in their traditional rights and powers over energy regu-
lation. 
This bright-line distinction between what the states can regu-
late versus what the federal government can regulate has been fur-
ther illuminated over time. In 1927, the Supreme Court found in 
Public Utilities Commission of Rhode Island v. Attleboro Steam 
and Electric Company that the states maintain jurisdiction over 
business which is essentially local, while under the Commerce 
Clause, Congress has the authority to regulate interstate sales of 
electricity.48 The Court also went on to emphasize the differences 
between state and federal regulation of electricity: the states have 
the power to govern intrastate actions, including the generation of 
electricity and its sale at retail to consumers, while the federal gov-
ernment has the power to regulate interstate issues, including the 
transmission of electricity and wholesale electricity markets.49 By 
1935, Congress enacted the Federal Power Act which further es-
tablished the bright line barriers of authority by providing that 
states retained jurisdiction “over facilities used for the generation 
                                                          
 45. 66 Pub. L. 369, 41 Stat. 1353 (enacted March 3, 1921).  
 46. First Iowa Hydro-Elec. Coop. v. FPC, 328 U.S. 152, 174 (1946) (quoting 56 Cong. 
Rec. 9810). 
 47. FPC v. S. Cal. Edison Cop., 376 U.S. 205, 218 (1964).  
 48. See 273 U.S. 83, 85–86 (1927). 
 49. See id.  
298 IDAHO LAW REVIEW VOL. 53 
 
of electric energy or over facilities used in location distribution[,] 
or only for the transmission of electric energy in interstate com-
merce, [and] over facilities for the transmission of electric energy 
consumed wholly by the transmitter,” while the federal govern-
ment retained jurisdiction over only “those matters which are not 
subject to regulation by the states.”50 Therefore, the states retain 
authority and regulatory control over electricity-generating facili-
ties that provide power to their states’ citizens, along with the 
transmission to end users and the retail rates charged to electric 
customers; whereas the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission51 
retains regulatory control over transmission lines, gas pipelines, 
wholesale electric rates, and other things that are interstate affairs 
within the electric industry realm.52 
States have intrastate responsibilities when it comes to regu-
lating electricity for its people. Typically, utility commissions or 
state public utility commissions have the discretion over which 
new power facilities receive certificates of public convenience and 
necessity.53 State laws can restrict this discretion by providing 
guidelines or requirements when siting new electric generating fa-
cilities; like taking into consideration whether or not the facility is 
needed for base, intermediate, and peak loads, or if it is the lowest 
cost system to provide for energy demand.54 It is also important 
                                                          
 50. 16 U.S.C. § 824(a)–(b)(1) (2015).  
 51. The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, previously known as the Federal 
Power Commission, is an independent agency. See Department of Energy Organization Act, 
Pub. L. 95-91, § 204, 91 Stat. 565 (1977); see generally FERC, What FERC Does, 
http://www.ferc.gov/about/ferc-does.asp, (last updated June 24, 2014). 
 52. See FERC v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742, 755 (1982) (the federal regulation of in-
trastate power transmission is proper because of interstate nature of generation and supply of 
electricity); see also JOEY LEE MIRANDA, AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION SECTION OF STATE AND 
LOCAL GOVERNMENT LAW, SECTION OF ENVIRONMENT, ENERGY, AND RESOURCES, CAPTURING 
THE POWER OF ELECTRIC RESTRUCTURING, 6–8 (2009).  
 53. See AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, The Need for Power and the Choice of Technol-
ogies: State Decisions on Electric Power Facilities, 3 (June 1981). 
 54. See id. at 2–3. Base, intermediate, or peaking load refers to the overall time of 
day demands and level of demands that consumers place on electricity generating facilities. 
These categories are based on load factors which refers to the percentage of hours a power 
plant can operate at its maximum capability in a given time. Base load facilities typically have 
a load factor exceeding 75% and are typically heavily depended upon to provide constant reli-
able service; a coal burning facility would fall into this category. Intermediate load plants typ-
ically have load factors between 40% and 60%, like a hydroelectric plant. Peak load generators 
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that state utility commissions, regulators, and utilities attempt to 
plan ahead and forecast for future needs of certain electric gener-
ators to ensure a diverse energy portfolio.55 This is significant be-
cause a diverse energy mix has the potential to assure a continued 
supply of electricity in the event of “a renewed oil embargo . . . [or] 
shutdowns in nuclear plants,” while also ensuring that states re-
main self-sufficient in their ability to provide electricity services 
for its people.56 Thus, state utility commissions have the ultimate 
authority and discretion to choose whether or not to approve a util-
ity’s new electric generating facility proposal and, therefore, to de-
cide exactly what sources it deems necessary and sufficient to cost 
effectively provide its citizens with electricity.  
As a result, for the past one hundred or so years, states have 
continued to control economic aspects of electricity generation, 
such as “regulating electrical utilities for determining questions of 
need, reliability, cost and other related state concerns.”57 This au-
thority has been consistent with the traditional obligations and re-
sponsibilities of the states, while federal energy regulators have 
had the authority to regulate “the need for and pricing of electrical 
power transmitted in interstate commerce.”58 
B. EPA Authority and the Clean Power Plan 
The Constitution may not expressly mention the existence of 
agencies, but Congress has created numerous agencies through 
their legislative power.59 In the last century, Congress has rou-
tinely delegated quasi-legislative power to federal agencies like the 
                                                          
typically operate at low load factors between 5% and 15%, like photovoltaic solar panel gener-
ators. See John Hynes, How to Compare Power Generation Choices (Oct. 29, 2009), 
http://www.renewableenergyworld.com/articles/print/rewna/volume-1/issue-1/solar-en-
ergy/how-to-compare-power-generation-choices.html. 
 55. See AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, supra note 53, at 3. 
 56. Id. 
 57. Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. State Energy Res. Conservation & Dev. Comm’n, 461 U.S. 
190, 205–06 (1983). 
 58.  Id. 
 59. See U.S. CONST. art. I. 
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Federal Communication Commission, the Securities and Exchange 
Commission, the Environmental Protection Agency, and many oth-
ers.60 With this Congressional delegation, these agencies have rule 
making power carrying the force of law.61 Congress has allowed 
this for many reasons, but a significant one is that Congress often 
delegates legislative power to administrative agencies in areas of 
complex regulation that require specific expertise and knowledge 
to solve specific problems.62 For example, figuring out what stand-
ards ensure that water quality or air quality is healthy is left to 
the EPA since Congress does not have the specific expertise to han-
dle such complex and scientific topics.63 Agencies also have execu-
tive and judicial power provided to them when Congress creates 
them and thus they can enforce the regulations they promulgate 
and adjudicate violations of their rules.64 
The EPA is an independent agency with an interesting his-
tory. The agency is led by an Administrator, who is appointed by 
the President and thus has cabinet-level status. The EPA, 
uniquely, was not actually statutorily created.65 President Nixon 
submitted an executive order to Congress on July 9, 1970, calling 
for the establishment of the EPA in response to increasing concerns 
about the inefficiency and inability of the existing agencies to com-
bat the country’s growing environmental issues.66 Congress ap-
proved a plan to reorganize existing agencies to form a new, cen-
tralized agency for the environment, and, as a result, formed the 
EPA on December 4, 1970.67 
                                                          
 60. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 25, at 333.  
 61. See id. at 333-34. 
 62. See RICHARD H. SEAMON, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, 22–24 (2013). 
 63. Id. 
 64. See CHEMERINKSY, supra note 25, at 334. 
 65. Agencies are commonly “creatures of statute” because they are primarily created 
by statute. See SEAMON, supra note 63, at 12.  
 66. See ENV’T PROT. AGENCY, REORGANIZATION PLAN NO. 3 OF 1970 (July 9, 1970), 
http://www.epa.gov/aboutepa/reorganization-plan-no-3-1970; see generally ENV’T PROT. 
AGENCY, EPA HISTORICAL PUBLICATION, THE GUARDIAN: ORIGINS OF THE EPA (1992), 
http://www.epa.gov/aboutepa/guardian-origins-epa. 
 67. See ENV’T PROT. AGENCY, EPA ORDER 1110.2, INITIAL ORGANIZATION OF THE 
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY (Dec. 4, 1970), http://www.epa.gov/aboutepa/epa-order-
2017 FOR THE GREATEST GOOD OF THE GREATEST 
NUMBER: MITIGATING CLIMATE CHANGE THROUGH 
CARBON DIOXIDE EMISSION REGULATION 
301 
 
During this creation period, and essentially ever since, the 
EPA has been a very active agency. The EPA has broad authority 
to enact regulations in accordance with the laws and orders it is 
charged with administering, which are commonly designed to pro-
tect human health and the environment.68 Even in its early years, 
the EPA placed approximately 1,500 rulemaking notices in the 
Federal Register annually.69 The EPA promulgates all of these reg-
ulations, and the national standards within them, to ensure that 
the citizens of this country are protected from significant risks to 
human health and to reduce environmental risks.70 
In enacting the Clean Air Act, a comprehensive regulatory 
scheme for addressing the problem of air pollution, Congress did 
not delegate authority to the EPA to carry out the administration 
of the Act until 1970.71 In 1970, Congress enacted a comprehensive 
set of amendments to the Clean Air Act that shifted the responsi-
bility of administering it to the EPA, whereas before it was dele-
gated to the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare.72 The 
amendments provided the EPA with the authority to establish Na-
tional Ambient Air Quality Standards, develop New Source Perfor-
mance Standards for new and modified sources of pollution, and 
develop regulatory guidance for states to use in developing their 
State Implementation Plans.73 
                                                          
11102. For more historical information on the EPA and its creation, see generally Phil Wis-
man, EPA History (1970-1985) (Nov. 1985), http://www.epa.gov/aboutepa/epa-history-1970-
1985. 
 68. See generally ENV’T PROT. AGENCY, Laws and Executive Orders, 
http://www.epa.gov/laws-regulations/laws-and-executive-orders (last updated Sept. 11, 2015). 
 69. See Wisman, supra note 67. 
 70. See ENV’T PROT. AGENCY, Our Mission and What We Do, 
http://www.epa.gov/aboutepa/our-mission-and-what-we-do (last updated Aug. 18, 2016). 
 71. See Clean Air Act Amendments of 1970, Pub. L. 91-604, 84 Stat. 1676 (1970); see 
also Paul G. Rogers, EPA History: The Clean Air Act of 1970, 
http://www.epa.gov/aboutepa/epa-history-clean-air-act-1970 (last updated Feb. 10, 2016).  
 72. See id.  
 73. See Rogers, supra note 71.  
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Then, in 1990 Congress added further amendments to clarify 
and advance the Clean Air Act’s purpose.74 In doing so, the 1990 
amendments divided the Clean Air Act into six titles.75 Title I deals 
with preventing and reducing air pollution from stationary 
sources, which is the main focus of the Clean Power Plan.76 
The Clean Air Act, like other environmental statutes, success-
fully establishes a cooperative federalism regime.77 Congress dele-
gated the task of setting National Ambient Air Quality Standards 
for harmful air pollutants to the EPA while requiring the states to 
devise State Implementation Plans to achieve those standards.78 If 
the EPA disapproves of a state’s plan, it may substitute it with a 
federal implementation plan.79 Therefore, Congress designed the 
Clean Air Act with authority and responsibilities divided between 
                                                          
 74. The purposes outlined by the Clean Air Act are:  
to protect and enhance the quality of the Nation’s air resources so as to 
promote the public health and welfare and the productive capacity of its 
populations; to initiate and accelerate a national research and develop-
ment program to achieve the prevention and control of air pollution; to 
provide technical and financial assistance to State and local governments 
in connection with the development and execution of their air pollution 
prevention and control programs; and to encourage and assist the devel-
opment and operation of regional air pollution prevention and control pro-
grams.   
42 U.S.C. § 7401(b) (2015).  
 75. See 42 U.S.C. §§7401–7671 (2015). 
 76. Stationary sources are all sources of air pollution, which result from immobile 
facilities. These include, but are not limited to, power generation facilities, industrial facilities, 
schools, and government facilities. See 42 U.S.C. § 7411(a)(3) (2015).  
 77. Cooperative federalism refers to a concept in which the state governments and 
the federal government share responsibility in the governance of the people for a common goal 
or purpose. See Cooperative Federalism Law & Legal Definition, USLEGAL.COM, http://defini-
tions.uslegal.com/c/cooperative-federalism/ (last visited Sept. 7, 2016). Here, under the Clean 
Air Act, the common goal or purpose would be to ensure good air quality to protect the peoples’ 
health and general welfare. See 42 U.S.C. § 7401(b) (2015). 
 78. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401–7431, (2015).; see also Appalachian Power Co. v. EPA, 249 
F.3d 1032 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (the Clean Air Act establishes a commitment to cooperative feder-
alism). 
 79. See Appalachian Power Co., 249 F.3d at 1037; see also Hodel v. Virginia Surface 
Min., & Reclamation Ass’n. Inc., 452 U.S. 264, 288–89 (1981) (if the state elects not to submit 
a plan, the regulatory burden will fall onto the EPA, thus the states have freedom to choose).  
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federal and state governments to advance air pollution mitigation 
and establish an interdependent partnership that ensures emis-
sion reductions. 
Specifically under the Clean Air Act, the EPA’s Administrator 
is delegated the responsibility of establishing air quality stand-
ards, within section 111, for new and modified stationary sources 
of air pollutions which must meet the New Source Performance 
Standards for their particular industrial source category.80 These 
New Source Performance Standards are “technology based” stand-
ards developed individually for industrial source categories, like 
electric generation facilities.81 These standards set forth  maxi-
mum allowable emission levels and are based on the best level of 
pollution control currently demonstrated by sources within the 
specific industry.82 Technology based New Source Performance 
Standards are developed in an effort to reflect “the degree of emis-
sion limitation achievable through the application of the best sys-
tem of emission reduction,” which has been “adequately demon-
strated” in the relevant industrial sector.83 While evaluating the 
best system of emission reduction applications, the EPA adminis-
trator must consider the “cost of achieving such reduction and any 
non-air quality health and environmental impact and energy re-
quirements.”84 
Under section 111, the administrator of the EPA is required to 
develop a New Source Performance Standard for a source category 
if that source “causes, or contributes significantly to, air pollution 
which may reasonable be anticipated to endanger public health or 
welfare.”85 Once it is found that a source greatly impacts air quality 
                                                          
 80. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 7411(b) (2015). 
 81. See id. § 7411(d)(1). 
 82. See id. § 7411(a)(1). For example, carbon sequestration technologies have been 
viewed as the best method to reduce emissions that have been adequately demonstrated by 
the electric industry, even though it is not one of the most cost-effective measures. See Stand-
ards of Performance, 80 Fed. Reg. at 64, 727–28. 
 83. Id. § 7411(a)(1). 
 84. Id. 
 85. Id. § 7411(b)(1)(A). 
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via a certain air pollutant, like carbon dioxide, the administrator 
will conduct and issue an endangerment finding which may find 
that the source threatens the public health and welfare.86 Once this 
finding is completed and published into the Federal Register, the 
administrator can move forward in deciding how to regulate that 
source for the pollutant at issue.87 
The EPA was in a unique situation when it was propelled into 
the position of regulating carbon dioxide, a greenhouse gas, from 
stationary sources. In Massachusetts v. EPA, the Supreme Court 
decided that the EPA has authority to regulate greenhouse gases 
from motor vehicles under § 202(a)(1) of the Clean Air Act.88 The 
Court also decided that carbon dioxide, which is the most prevalent 
and aggregately harmful greenhouse gas, qualifies as an “air pol-
lutant” under § 302(g) of the Act.89 This determination that carbon 
dioxide qualifies as an air pollutant within the Act’s regulatory 
scheme allows for the EPA to regulate it via endangerment find-
ings and promulgated standards under other sections of the Act.90 
As a result, this extension of regulatory capability has propelled 
                                                          
 86. See generally ENV’T PROT. AGENCY, Endangerment and Cause or Contribute 
Findings for Greenhouse Gases under Section 202(a) of the Clean Air Act, EPA, 
http://www3.epa.gov/climatechange/endangerment/ (last updated Aug. 9, 2016) [hereinafter 
Greenhouses Gases] (EPA’s endangerment finding for greenhouse gases instigated by the Su-
preme Court’s holding in Massachusetts v. EPA).  
 87. Id.; See also Endangerment and Cause or Contribute Findings for Greenhouse 
Gases under Section 202(a) of the Clean Air Act; Final Rule, 70 Fed. Reg. 239 (Dec. 15, 2009) 
(to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 1). 
 88. See Massachusetts v. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 549 U.S. 497, 532–33 (2007). The EPA 
endangerment finding that followed this decision, to regulate greenhouse gases from new mo-
tor vehicles or new motor vehicle engines (i.e. mobile sources), established that greenhouse 
gases emitted from mobile sources may reasonably be anticipated to endanger public health 
or welfare. See Greenhouse Gases, supra note 86. Here, in regards to stationary sources like 
power plants, the EPA had a foundation to establish that a given category of sources, power 
plants, may reasonably be anticipated to endanger public health or welfare. Although these 
are two separate endangerment findings, the initial Section 202 endangerment finding estab-
lished after this case was decided created a platform for the Section 111 endangerment finding 
for power plants emitting greenhouse gases. Cf. 42 U.S.C. §§ 7421, 7411(b)(1); see also gener-
ally Greenhouse Gases, supra note 86. 
 89. Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 532.  
 90. Id. at 533. 
2017 FOR THE GREATEST GOOD OF THE GREATEST 
NUMBER: MITIGATING CLIMATE CHANGE THROUGH 
CARBON DIOXIDE EMISSION REGULATION 
305 
 
the EPA to regulate carbon dioxide emissions from electric gener-
ating facilities, under section 111 of the Act, through its Clean 
Power Plan regulation.91 
III. DEBATING THE GREATEST GOOD: THE CURRENT 
STRUGGLE FOR REGULATORY AUTHORITY 
Due to the official publication of the EPA’s Clean Power Plan, 
there is a growing debate as to who has the proper authority in 
regulating energy. Proponents of state regulation claim that the 
EPA has overstepped its bounds by attempting to regulate electric-
ity generation at the state level and thus the regulation should be 
repealed.92 However, the EPA, its supporters, and supporters of the 
Plan claim that the EPA is well within its bounds in regulating 
carbon dioxide as an air pollutant, and is making great strides to-
wards mitigating climate change as well as serving the overarch-
ing purposes of the Clean Air Act.93 The ultimate issue underlying 
these arguments and claims is whether the EPA, through its prom-
ulgation of the Plan, has overstepped its regulatory authority un-
der the Clean Air Act by establishing a policy that sets emission 
standards and essentially provides for how states should generate 
electricity. 
                                                          
 91. See Standards of Performance, supra note 7; see also Regulatory Actions- Devel-
oping carbon pollution standards for power plants under the Clean Air Act, EPA, 
http://www.epa.gov/cleanpowerplan/regulatory-actions (last updated Feb. 11, 2015). 
 92. See generally Joint Reply of West Virginia, et al., Oklahoma, et al., North Da-
kota, and Mississippi in Support of Motions for Stay and for Expedited Consideration (2015) 
(No. 15-1363) (consolidated to West Virginia v. EPA, 136 S. Ct. 1000 (2016)); see also 
Naveena Sadasivam, Congress Launches Legislative Assault on Obama Administration’s 
Clean Power Plan, INSIDE CLIMATE NEWS (Oct. 28, 2015), http://insideclimate-
news.org/news/28102015/congress-legislative-assault-obama-administration-clean-power-
plan-mitch-mcconnell.  
 93. See generally Respondent EPA’s Opposition to Motions to Stay Final Rule, West 
Virginia v. EPA, 136 S. Ct. 1000 (2016) (No. 15-1363); see also Legal Analysis: Strong Likeli-
hood EPA Climate Plan Will Stand Up in Court, ENVTL. DEFENSE FUND (July 30, 2015), 
https://www.edf.org/media/legal-analysis-strong-likelihood-epa-climate-plan-will-stand-court. 




A. The Clean Power Plan: the EPA’s Strategy to Combat Carbon 
Dioxide Emissions 
The Clean Power Plan is a vast effort by the EPA to reduce 
carbon dioxide emissions released by stationary electric generating 
facilities.94 The goal of the Clean Power Plan is to reduce carbon 
dioxide levels by 32 percent, from 2005 levels, by 2030.95 The rule 
provides applicable carbon dioxide emission standards, or stand-
ards of performance, to new, modified, and existing stationary 
power plants via its authority under the Clean Air Act, section 
111.96 
The Plan requires that states develop and submit their own 
plans to the EPA, providing their methods and strategies to comply 
with their state specific goals set by the EPA.97 If a state fails to do 
this, the EPA will step in with their own federal plan.98 Moreover, 
if the state submits a plan that is not deemed satisfactory by the 
EPA, the EPA will promulgate a federal plan that directly limits 
emissions from the state’s existing sources until the state submits 
a satisfactory plan.99 However, it is important to note that the 
                                                          
 94. Carbon Pollution Emission Guidelines for Existing Stationary Sources: Electric 
Utility Generating Units, 80 Fed. Reg. 64,665 (Oct. 23, 2015) [hereinafter 80 Fed. Reg. 64,665]. 
 95. Id.  
 96. Id. at 64,510, 64,662–65. 
 97. For example, the EPA’s carbon dioxide emissions goals for the state of Idaho is 
771 pounds per megawatt-hour by 2030. See EPA, Clean Power Plan: State at a Glance: Idaho 
(Aug. 3, 2015), https://www3.epa.gov/airquality/cpptoolbox/idaho.pdf. Since all state goals fall 
in a range between 771 pounds per megawatt-hour to 1,305 pounds per megawatt-hour, Idaho 
has one of the more stringent state goals compared to other state goals in the Clean Power 
Plan; i.e. Washington, Idaho’s neighboring state, has a goal of 983 pounds per megawatt-hour 
by 2030. See EPA, Clean Power Plan: State at a Glance: Washington (Aug. 3, 2015), 
http://www3.epa.gov/airquality/cpptoolbox/washington.pdf. 
 98. 80 Fed. Reg. 64,665, supra note 96, at 64,942. 
 99. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 7411(d)(2). 
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Clean Power Plan is intended to be phased in gradually, over an 
extended period of time.100 
Although the regulation directs the states to provide a plan or 
an initial submission by September 2016,101 the EPA is only requir-
ing the states, through this submission, to request and obtain an 
extension to complete their plans until September 2018.102 Or the 
states may provide “minimal information” concerning the status of 
the state’s planning and development efforts in the alternative of 
requesting an extension.103 This “minimal information” require-
ment specifically requires the states to identify their planning 
methods under consideration, including any progress to date, a de-
scription of opportunities for public input on their strategies to im-
plement the regulation, and, if necessary, a sufficient explanation 
for why the state needs an extension.104 Therefore, the states have 
potentially up to two years to submit satisfactory plans to the 
EPA.105 
Within the Plan, the EPA has provided three building block 
strategies for carbon dioxide emission reductions, or in other 
terms, three best systems for emission reductions.106 These meth-
ods of emission reductions are: improving efficiency at power 
plants, primarily coal burning plants, through modification and/or 
partial carbon sequestration technologies; shifting energy genera-
tion from higher emitting coal to lower emitting natural gas power 
plants; and shifting energy generation to zero emitting power 
                                                          
100. See Fact Sheet: Overview of the Clean Power Plan Cutting Carbon Pollution from 
Power Plants, EPA, http://www.epa.gov/cleanpowerplan/fact-sheet-overview-clean-power-plan 
(last updated Aug. 6, 2016). 
101. This deadline is delayed now due to the Supreme Court’s order to stay the Plan. 
See infra note 170 for more information.  




106. Id. at 64, 667. 
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plants, i.e. renewable energy generators.107 The states also have 
the option of purchasing emission rate credits from other states 
that have low to zero emitting power plants via trading based emis-
sion programs.108 
This is where the authority battle arises. By regulating and 
thus attempting to recommend and implement these specific build-
ing blocks, the EPA is essentially establishing a policy of how each 
state should regulate and design its energy generation portfolio. 
Typically, the choice of what energy generation portfolio or mix 
states have for electricity generation has been up to state energy 
regulators. This attempt by the EPA, to establish a policy of pref-
erable electricity generation options to reduce carbon dioxide emis-
sions, is an indirect method of manipulating the states’ traditional 
energy regulatory authority. 
B. The Resultant Power War: States versus the EPA 
In the pursuit of reducing carbon dioxide emissions while in-
fluencing the regulatory regime of electricity production, the EPA 
and the states are in unique positions, authoritatively speaking. 
Whereas one has congressionally delegated authority to regulate 
air pollutants to protect and benefit this country’s welfare and 
health, the other has both congressionally recognized and tradi-
tional sovereign authority over its decisions in electricity genera-
tion regulation.109 While the EPA has authority to regulate air pol-
lutants under the Clean Air Act, the states argue that the manner 
in which it is doing so here, through the promulgation of the Clean 
Power Plan, is a far reaching step into their territory.  
Although this is not the first attempt the EPA has made in 
regulating power plants, this is the first of its kind that directs the 
states to plan and implement methods of emission reductions that 
extend beyond the fence line.110 This is chiefly why so many states 
                                                          
107. Id. 
108. See 80 Fed. Reg. 64, 665, supra note 96, at 64, 709, 64, 834–35.  
109. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 7401 (2015) (Clean Air Act findings and declaration of purpose); 
see also 16 U.S.C.A. §§ 824(a), (b)(1).  
110. Beyond the fence line can be understood by a comparison to methods of emission 
reductions that can be achieved within the fence line of a power plant. For example, with a coal 
burning power plant, a within the fence line emission reduction would be to modify it with 
technological devices that increase heat rate (essentially increasing the plant’s efficiency) so it 
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and utilities are challenging this regulation as being an abuse of 
the EPA’s discretion—it exceeds the EPA’s authority under the 
Clean Air Act, and it is arbitrary and capricious.111 As the EPA 
ventures into this new territory of regulation, it is necessary to es-
tablish regulatory fence posts demarking the limit of states and 
EPA influence within this dilemma. 
1. The States’ Power Position: Arguments for State Authority 
Over forty years ago, in District of Columbia v. Train, the D.C. 
Circuit Court blocked a similar rulemaking by the EPA.112 This de-
cision signified an important milestone in the evolving constitu-
tional doctrines prohibiting “commandeering,” “entrenchment,” 
and “coercion.”113 In its decision, the court found that Congress did 
not delegate to the EPA the power to require states to adopt and 
enforce the legal changes the agency wanted them to implement.114 
The Court further found that the EPA could not achieve its pur-
poses by requiring states to lend their police power.115 
                                                          
reduces carbon dioxide emissions, or to implement carbon capture sequestration which would 
further reduce carbon dioxide emissions. These are both examples of within the fence line 
emission reduction methods. Beyond the fence line methods of emission reductions are the 
latter two building blocks that the Clean Power Plan recommends, which are switching gen-
eration to low-emitting natural gas burning power plants or zero emitting power plants like 
wind or solar power generation. See infra Sections III.B.2. 
111. See generally States Petitioners’ Motion for Stay & for Expedited Consideration 
of Petition for Review, W. Va. v. EPA, USCA Case No. 15-1363 (Oct. 23, 2015); see generally 
Joint Reply of West Virginia, et al., Oklahoma, et al., North Dakota, and Mississippi in Support 
of Motions for Stay and for Expedited Consideration (2015) (No. 15-1363) (consolidated to West 
Virginia v. EPA, 136 S. Ct. 1000 (2016)). That motion for stay was denied by the D.C. Circuit 
Court of Appeals on January 21, 2016. See Gavin Bade, DC Circuit Court denies stay on EPA 
Clean Power Plan, UTILITYDIVE (Jan. 21, 2016), http://www.utilitydive.com/news/dc-circuit-
court-denies-stay-on-epa-clean-power-plan/412514/. 
112. District of Columbia v. Train, 521 F.2d 971, 974 (D.C. Cir. 1975). 
113. See id.  
114. Id. 
115. Id. 
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Less than forty years later, the Supreme Court heard a case 
that resulted in a blockade and rejection of a regulation imple-
mented by the EPA that had the purpose of regulating carbon di-
oxide emissions.116 The Court revisited its earlier Massachusetts v. 
EPA decision and read it as authority for Clean Air Act regulation 
of carbon dioxide, but not necessarily for programmatic regulation, 
understanding that the EPA may, under certain circumstances, 
use best available control technology to force improvements in en-
ergy efficiency at plant levels.117 This can likely allow for regulation 
of power plants at the “end-of-stack[s]” but not necessarily beyond 
the fence lines, or beyond the power plant itself, essentially.118 The 
Court also held that “[w]hen an agency claims to discover in a long-
extant statute an unheralded power to regulate a significant por-
tion of the American economy, we typically greet its announcement 
with a measure of skepticism.”119 Under review, this provides some 
insight as to how apprehensive regulators and courts should be 
when analyzing whether the EPA has the authority to step in to 
regulate the electric generating industry. 
It is well established that federal agencies are to regulate 
within their delegated realms of specialty or expertise.120 No fed-
eral agency may exercise regulatory jurisdiction not delegated to it 
by Congress, especially if it has been already delegated to a differ-
ent federal agency or reserved by the Constitution to the states.121 
As discussed earlier, after many years of regulatory evolution, the 
lines of authority in the energy regulatory realm are sufficiently 
clear. The regulation of utilities “is one of the most important of 
the functions traditionally associated with the police power of the 
States.”122 Although there is a distinct federal role in regulating the 
interstate affairs of electricity generation and transmission of 
wholesale power, Congress delegated that authoritative role to the 
                                                          
116. See Util. Air Regulatory Grp. v. EPA, 134 S. Ct. 2427, 2444 (2014).  
117. Id. at 2444–46. 
118. See id. at 2447. 
119. Id. at 2444 (internal quotation and citation omitted). 
120. See SEAMON, supra note 62, at 22–24. 
121. See Niagara Mohawk Power Corp. v. FERC, 452 F.3d 822, 824 (D.C. Cir. 2006).  
122. Ark. Elec. Coop. Corp. v. Ark. Pub. Serv. Comm’n., 461 U.S. 375, 377 (1983).  
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Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, not the EPA.123 Thus, 
technically speaking, the EPA has no regulatory authority over in-
tra or interstate generation, transmission, or dispatch of electric-
ity.124 
Generally speaking, through the promulgation of the Clean 
Power Plan, the EPA believes it has the authority to regulate out-
side of the electric generator’s fence line, induce states to exercise 
their legislative power, and subject their regulatory officials to de-
sign satisfactory electricity generation plans.125 To the states, this 
in and of itself is a coercive action in that it reduces state authority 
in its traditional role of electricity generation planning.126 To pro-
tect the states and ideals of federalism, the Supreme Court has 
prohibited the federal government from usurping the authority of 
the states as well as prohibited state officers from being forced to 
administer federal programs.127 Therefore, “[t]he Federal Govern-
ment may not compel the States to enact or administer a federal 
regulatory program.”128 
In relation to EPA state implementation plans, which the EPA 
essentially requires in the Clean Power Plan, in 2012 the Sixth 
Circuit applied these “anti-commandeering principles” to hold that 
state officials could not be enjoined to enforce, or penalized for lack 
of enforcement, the provisions of a state implementation plan.129 
Accordingly, although a state might propose and submit a satisfac-
tory plan to the EPA, it could later alter its actions and not follow 
                                                          
123. See Federal Power Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 792, 797 (2015).  
124. See id. 
125. See generally Carbon Pollution Emission Guidelines for Existing Stationary 
Sources: Electric Utility Generating Units, 80 Fed. Reg. at 64, 662; see generally Application 
by 29 States and State Agencies for Immediate Stay of Final Agency Action During Pendency 
of Petitions for Review, W. Va. v. EPA, No. 16 (U.S. Jan. 26, 2016). 
126. See Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 925 (1997); see also New York v. United 
States, 505 U.S. 144, 188 (1992). 
127. See Printz, 521 U.S. at 925; New York, 505 U.S. at 188.  
128. New York, 505 U.S. at 188. 
129. See Sierra Club v. Korleski, 681 F.3d 342, 348–50 (6th Cir. 2012) (the state 
elected to not enforce its plan since the EPA rejected its request to amend). 
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through with its plan.130 Once a state has submitted a satisfactory 
plan, the EPA can only induce a state to comply with its plan and 
the EPA’s overarching carbon dioxide reduction goals through non-
coercive means.131 However, the EPA has specifically chosen to di-
rect the states to incorporate state plans assuring that they meet 
certain carbon dioxide reduction levels via the states’ own policing 
powers because the EPA itself lacks the regulatory authority to po-
lice power generation and distribution. This makes it more appar-
ent that ultimately the rule may not work as efficiently the EPA 
had intended since it is relying on cooperative federalism estab-
lishing partnerships between itself and the states. This intrepid 
regulatory endeavor is facing hurdles due to its attempt to influ-
ence and dictate how states generate their electricity. 
2. The EPA’s Power Position: Arguments for EPA Authority 
Despite these challenges and state energy regulatory hurdles, 
the EPA has its sources for its regulatory authority, generally, as 
well as for its promulgation of the Clean Power Plan. First and 
foremost, it is important to note that the EPA has gone through 
proper administrative procedures in promulgating the Clean 
Power Plan regulation132 and has referenced section 111(d) as its 
ultimate authority for regulating stationary electric generating fa-
cilities.133 Although the text of section 111 has been interpreted as 
applying only to end-of-stack technology, here the end-of-stack 
emission reduction technology for electric generating units, this 
does not strictly mean that it only applies to within the fence line 
technologies.134 In fact, there is important precedent for incorporat-
ing beyond the fence line methods in section 111 standards and 
                                                          
130. Id. 
131. Id. at 352–53.  
132. See generally ENV’T PROT. AGENCY, Clean Power Plan for Existing Power Plants: 
Rule History, EPA (last updated Feb. 11, 2016), https://www.epa.gov/cleanpowerplan/clean-
power-plan-existing-power-plants#rule-history; see also 42 U.S.C. §§ 7411(b), (d) (2015) (the 
EPA Administrator shall, after designating air pollutants, establish and promulgate regula-
tions and standards for those air pollutants through informal rulemaking; such standards are 
effective upon promulgation). For more information on informal rulemaking, please see 
SEAMON, supra note 62, at 243–82 (Chapter 12- Informal Rulemaking).  
133. See Standards of Performance, supra note 7. 
134. See Sierra Club, 657 F.2d at 372; see also Small Refiner Lead Phase-Down Task 
Force v. EPA, 705 F.2d 506, 534–36 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (upheld another beyond the fence line 
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thus establishing authority for the EPA to allow beyond fence line 
messures for emission reductions.135 
In the 1977 Clean Air Act Amendments, Congress established 
that section 111 standards could and should reflect the availability 
of fuel pretreatment measures that could lower emissions of regu-
lated air pollutants, like coal washing.136 Congress recognized that 
these strategies were typically implemented at offsite facilities 
since they did not distinguish between onsite and offsite measures 
of pretreatment capabilities.137 Rather, Congress instructed the 
EPA to “give credit for accepted minemouth and other precombus-
tion fuel cleaning processes, whether they occur at, or are achieved 
by, the source or by another party.”138 Two years after these amend-
ments were established, the EPA created a sulfur dioxide standard 
for coal fired power plants that included a fuel pretreatment re-
quirement. In Sierra Club v. Costle, the sulfur dioxide standard 
was challenged but the court upheld it after explaining that the 
standard was based on the idea that “utilities would enter into con-
tract arrangements with their suppliers to obtain and guarantee 
that coal supplies meet the needed treatment criteria,” which the 
court viewed as a lawful exercise of EPA’s authority under section 
111, and thus upheld a beyond the fence line measure of pretreat-
ing coal supplies before they are sent to power plants.139 Thus, es-
tablishing early precedent for the availability of EPA’s authority to 
establish beyond the fence line measures of emission reductions. 
Although two of the three building blocks recommended to be 
implemented by the EPA require beyond the fence line measures, 
Congress and the courts have both allowed the EPA to establish 
such measures. However, it is important to recognize, according to 
                                                          
measure in order for small refiners to meet lead concentration standards); see also H.R. REP. 
NO. 95-564 at 130 (1977) (Conf. Rep.) (reprinted in 1977 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1502, 1510–11). 
135. See Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-95, title I, §109(b) (1977). 
136. See id. 
137. Id. 
138. H.R. REP. NO. 95-564, supra note 134, at 130. 
139. 657 F.2d 298, 372–73 (D.C. Cir. 1981); See also Small Refiner Lead Phase-Down, 
705 F.2d 506, 534–36. 
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the text of section 111, that such measures must be adequately 
demonstrated.140 Demonstration is likely not a concern for the EPA 
here, considering switching to natural gas burning generating fa-
cilities and renewable energy generation are technologies that 
have been demonstrated as effective methods for reducing emis-
sions for a long time.141 For example, the ability to transform an 
electric generating faciliy from burning coal to burning natural gas 
is becoming more efficient, and the dependence upon renewable 
electricity generating facilities is on the rise with more states im-
plementing renewable energy portfolio standards.142 Therefore, the 
EPA likely has legitimate authority in stating that these building 
block strategies of emission reductions have been sufficiently ade-
quately demonstrated. 
In addition, the Clean Air Act itself provides a broad policy of 
regulatory authority delegated specifically to the EPA. In promul-
gating the Clean Power Plan, the EPA is addressing one of the 
most important and urgent environmental challenges experienced 
throughout the world. By attempting to reduce carbon dioxide 
emissions, the EPA can mitigate the significant “threat to Ameri-
cans’ health and welfare” caused by long enduring changes in our 
climate, which potentially could result “in an array of severe nega-
tive effects.”143 These effects include, but are not limited to, 
“drought, disease, increasingly serious weather events, and rising 
                                                          
140. See 42 U.S.C. § 7411(a)(1) (2015).  
141. See Kennedy Maize, Tricky Business: Taking Down Old Coal Plants, POWER 
MAGAZINE (Dec. 1, 2014), http://www.powermag.com/tricky-business-taking-down-old-coal-
plants/?pagenum=1; see also Warren Leon, THE STATE OF STATE RENEWABLE PORTFOLIO 
STANDARDS, CESA STATE-FEDERAL RPS COLLABORATIVE, 4–5 (June 2013), 
http://www.cesa.org/assets/2013-Files/RPS/State-of-State-RPSs-Report-Final-June-2013.pdf; 
see also Energy sources have changed throughout the history of the United States, EIA (July 3, 
2013), https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.cfm?id=11951. To view the most updated or 
recent information about state renewable energy programs and how much renewable energy 
state programs specifically require, see generally DSIRE, U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, RENEWABLE 
PORTFOLIO STANDARD POLICES (Aug. 2016), http://ncsolarcen-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/wp-
content/uploads/2014/11/Renewable-Portfolio-Standards.pdf.  
142. See Maize, supra note 141; see also U.S. Energy Information Administration, 
Idaho State Profile and Energy Estimates, Analysis, EIA (last updated Nov. 19, 2015), 
http://www.eia.gov/state/analysis.cfm?sid=ID#64 [hereinafter U.S. Energy Information Ad-
ministration]. 
143. See Respondent EPA’s Opposition to Motions to Stay Final Rule, USCA Case 15-
1363, at 1 (Dec. 3, 2015). 
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sea levels.”144 In addition to reducing carbon dioxide emissions, the 
Plan will also be able to reduce existing power plants’ emissions of 
smog and soot forming pollutants like sulfur dioxide, nitrogen ox-
ides, and fine particles.145 These pollution reductions have the po-
tential to lower the rates of asthma attacks, respiratory disease, 
heart attacks, and premature deaths that occur each year due to 
the exposure of these pollutants.146 The EPA has valued the climate 
and health benefits of implementing the Clean Power Plan in the 
tens of billions of dollars. 147 Therefore, these potential emission 
reductions have the vast potential to not only improve the environ-
ment for future generations, through mitigating future emissions 
of carbon dioxide and thus alleviating some of the effects of climate 
change, but to also improve the present health and welfare of 
Americans. This significantly furthers the Clean Air Act’s purposes 
of protecting and enhancing air quality so as to promote public 
health and welfare.148 As a result, when considering the significant 
impacts and benefits the EPA’s promulgation of this Plan has, and 
its overarching goal of carrying out the Clean Air Act’s regulatory 
purpose, the EPA has the authority to regulate carbon dioxide 
emissions from stationary electricity generating facilities. 
To further analyze whether the EPA has proper authority to 
promulgate the Clean Power Plan under the Clean Air Act, com-
paring the Plan to the EPA’s lead reduction program provides in-
sights as to how far the EPA’s regulations may reach. Lead emis-
sions have historically been attributed to fuels in on–road motor 
vehicles, such as cars and trucks, and industrial processes, like 
                                                          
144. Id. 
145. See Carbon Pollution Emission Guidelines for Existing Stationary Sources: Elec-
tric Utility Generating Units, 80 Fed. Reg. at 64,670, 64,680–81 (Oct. 23, 2015). 
146. See EPA, EPA-452/R-15-003, REGULATORY IMPACT ANALYSIS FOR THE CLEAN 
POWER PLAN FINAL RULE, at 4-31, table 4-24 (Aug. 2015), http://www.epa.gov/sites/produc-
tion/files/2015-08/documents/cpp-final-rule-ria.pdf (summarizing health benefits associated 
with anticipated reduction in ozone and fine particle pollution).  
147. See id. at 4-45, table 4-31. 
148. See 42 U.S.C. § 7401(b). 
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lead smelters.149 Once ingested through the air or water, lead can 
accumulate in a person’s blood and bones which can adversely im-
pact their nervous system, kidney function, and immune system.150 
Due to this highly negative impact to human health, the EPA has 
promulgated standards for lead emissions under the National Am-
bient Air Quality Standards.151 The first lead regulation was prom-
ulgated by the EPA in 1978 and it was updated to a stricter stand-
ard in 2008.152 
Under the National Ambient Air Quality Standards program 
in the Clean Air Act, if a state fails to submit an implementation 
plan for achieving the lead standards, it could likely face a loss of 
highway funds or other sanctions.153 Also, if a specific state plan 
item is not met, in furtherance of achieving lead emission reduc-
tions, the Administrator of the EPA has the discretion to issue 
sanctions.154 Sanctions like these which can appear to be coercive 
in nature within cooperative federalism programs like this, have 
been upheld in numerous cases that involve Tenth Amendment 
challenges claiming that the EPA is being overly coercive.155 
                                                          
149. See ENV’T PROT. AGENCY, Basic Information about Lead Air Pollution: How Does 
Lead Get in the Air?, EPA, https://www.epa.gov/lead-air-pollution/basic-information-about-
lead-air-pollution#how (last updated March 30, 2016). 
150. See ENV’T PROT. AGENCY, Basic Information about Lead Air Pollution: What are 
the Effects of Lead on Human Health, EPA, https://www.epa.gov/lead-air-pollution/basic-infor-
mation-about-lead-air-pollution#health (last updated March 30, 2016). 
151. See 40 CFR § 50.12 (2009); see also 42 U.S.C. § 7409 (2015). 
152. See 43 Fed. Reg. 46,246 (Oct. 5, 1978); see also 73 Fed. Reg. 66,964 (Nov. 12, 2008). 
The lead standard was decreased from 1.5 micrograms per cubic meter of air to 0.15 mi-
crograms per cubic meter of air. 
153. See 42 U.S.C. § 7410(m); 42 U.S.C. § 7509(b). 
154. See 42 U.S.C. § 7509(a)–(b). 
155. Compare Miss. Comm’n on Envtl. Quality v. EPA, 790 F.3d 138, 177-79 (D.C. Cir. 
2015) (state is not at risk of losing all federal funds if it refuses to submit SIP; sanction is a 
“relatively mild encouragement to the states”), with New York, 505 U.S. 144, 176 (1992) (a 
choice between regulating under one federal instruction or forcing the state to submit to an-
other instruction if it declines the first is no choice at all), and Nat’l Fed’n of Indep.  Bus. v. 
Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2634 (2012) (finding unconstitutional a monetary inducement that 
was so coercive it compels the states to act). 
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Compared to this program of regulation, the Clean Power Plan 
appears to be relatively harmless. Unlike the penalty provision un-
der section 110(m) for states implementation plans for specific air 
pollutants, like lead, regulated under the National Ambient Air 
Quality Standards section, the Clean Power Plan does not impose 
any penalties for states.156 If a state chooses to not submit a plan 
the EPA will implement a federal plan itself.157 The states can also 
agree to work with the EPA, implementing certain aspects of the 
Clean Power Plan while leaving the others to the EPA to imple-
ment.158 Therefore, in comparison to other regulations of air pollu-
tants, like lead, where the EPA has the potential to impose penal-
ties for noncompliance, the Clean Power Plan involves minimal co-
ercion. 
C. The Current Battle: Ensuing Litigation Between the States 
and the EPA 
Less than twelve hours after the Clean Power Plan was pub-
lished in the Federal Register on October 22, 2015, twenty-six 
states and numerous industry associations filed over fifteen sepa-
rate cases challenging the EPA regulation.159 The lawsuits have 
been consolidated into one case, led by West Virginia and other 
states in opposition to the regulation, at the United States Court 
of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit.160 So far twenty-six 
of the fifty states have joined in opposition to the Plan, along with 
                                                          
156. See generally Carbon Pollution Emission Guidelines for Existing Stationary 
Sources: Electric Utility Generating Units, 80 Fed. Reg. at 64,942. 
157. See id. at 64,669, 64,947.  
158. See id. at 64,942. 
159. See E&E Publishing, LLC, supra note 10. 
160. See Andrew Childers, States Ask Supreme Court to Review Clean Power Plan 
Stay, INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENT REPORTER (Jan. 27, 2016), http://www.bna.com/states-
ask-supreme-n57982066591/. The states and state agencies joining in opposition of the EPA’s 
Clean Power Plan are: Alabama, Arizona, Arkansas, Colorado, Florida, Georgia, Indiana, Kan-
sas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Michigan, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, New Jersey, 
Ohio, Oklahoma, South Carolina, South Dakota, Texas, Utah, West Virginia, Wisconsin, Wy-
oming, Mississippi Department of Environmental Quality, Mississippi Public Service Commis-
sion, North Carolina Department of Environmental Quality, and Oklahoma Department of 
Environmental Quality. Id. 
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coal industry members, utilities, and the United States Chamber 
of Commerce.161 While the D.C. Circuit denied the motions made to 
stay the rule or block the standards while litigation ensues, it also 
announced its desire for the case to proceed quickly by scheduling 
oral arguments for June 2, 2016.162 However, on February 9, 2016, 
after the states applied for a stay with the Supreme Court,163 the 
Court ordered a stay on the Clean Power Plan in a five to four 
vote.164 Shortly after this decision, the D.C. Circuit announced that 
it would hear the case en banc on September 27, 2016.165 Therefore, 
                                                          
161. See id; see also Geoffrey Barnes & Danelle Gagliardi, How Challengers Obtained 
the Stay that Put US EPA’s Clean Carbon Plan on Hold, FRESH (Feb. 10, 2016),  
http://www.freshlawblog.com/2016/02/10/how-challengers-obtained-the-stay-that-put-
us-epas-clean-carbon-plan-on-hold/.  
162. See E&E Publishing, LLC, supra note 10. 
163. See generally States Petitioners’ Motion for Stay & for Expedited Consideration 
of Petition for Review, W. Va. v. EPA, USCA Case No. 15-1363 (Oct. 23, 2015) (Application by 
29 states and state agencies for immediate stay of final agency action during pendency of pe-
titions for review). 
164. This is an unusual and significant course of action that the Court has not taken 
before, which emphasizes how controversial and critical this regulation is, and has led some 
commentators to believe the Court is reacting to its previous dealings with the EPA’s MATS 
case. In that case, by the time the rule was partially invalidated by the Court, numerous power 
plants had already invested lots of money and complied with the rule, specifically up to 80% 
complied with the rule. Therefore, this could have influenced the Court in a concern for equity 
to stay the status quo and not allow the same course of action occur again. See Emily Holden, 
Elizabeth Harball & Ellen M. Gilmer, SCOTUS halts Clean Power Plan, stuns states planning 
carbon cuts, E&E PUBLISHING (Feb. 10, 2016), www.eenews.net/stories/1060032137; see also, 
Patrick Parenteau, Supreme Court Plays Politics with the Clean Power Plan, ACSBLOG (Feb. 
10, 2016), http://www.acslaw.org/acsblog/supreme-court-plays-politics-with-the-clean-power-
plan; Greg Stohr & Jennifer A. Dlouhy, Obama’s Clean-Power Plan Put on Hold by U.S. Su-
preme Court, BLOOMBERGPOLITICS (Feb. 9, 2016), http://www.bloomberg.com/politics/arti-
cles/2016-02-09/obama-s-clean-power-plan-put-on-hold-by-u-s-supreme-court; Lyle Dennis-
ton, Carbon Pollution Controls Put On Hold, SCOTUSBLOG (Feb. 9, 2016) (five to four vote 
with Justices Stephen Breyer, Ruth Ginsburg, Elena Kagan, and Sonia Sotomayor dissenting), 
http://www.scotusblog.com/2016/02/carbon-pollution-controls-put-on-hold/#more-238111. 
165. See Jonathan H. Adler, Clean Power Plant to get unanticipated en banc review, 
THE WASHINGTON POST (May 16, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-con-
spiracy/wp/2016/05/16/clean-power-plan-to-get-unanticipated-en-banc-review/; Andrew Chil-
ders, Full D.C. Circuit to Hear Clean Power Plan Argument, BLOOMBERG BNA (May 16, 2016), 
http://www.bna.com/full-dc-circuit-n57982072479/. The D.C. Circuit heard oral arguments 
over the Clean Power Plan on September 27, 2016, bypassing the usual hearing before a three-
judge panel. See Jonathan H. Adler, The en banc D.C. Circuit meets the Clean Power Plan, THE 
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until the D.C. Circuit finishes its review and the Supreme Court 
has finished its likely review, the deadlines within the Plan are 
delayed and the rule is overall at a standstill. 
Generally speaking, the challengers of the EPA regulation ar-
gue that the EPA is overstepping its authority under section 111(d) 
of the Clean Air Act by regulating broadly in the area of electricity 
generation, which impacts a vast part of the economy, traditionally 
regulated by the states.166 The challengers’ argument further con-
cludes that the EPA is barred from using section 111(d) to regulate 
stationary power plants and that it is an unconstitutional invasion 
of sovereign state rights.167 
V. BALANCING THE POWER POSITIONS: A SOLUTION FOR 
THE GREATEST NUMBER 
No matter how the ensuing litigation results, the EPA will reg-
ulate carbon dioxide emissions in some way or another. With exec-
utive approval, along with Supreme Court decisions that support 
the EPA’s ability to regulate carbon dioxide emissions under the 
Clean Air Act, there is no question that the EPA can regulate this 
air pollutant.168 The significant question to consider is how the 
EPA should regulate carbon dioxide emissions and what methods 
can the EPA prescribe without over stepping its regulatory bounds 
under the Clean Air Act. In addition, although the Clean Power 
                                                          
WASHINGTON POST (Sept. 28, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspir-
acy/wp/2016/09/28/the-en-banc-d-c-circuit-meets-the-clean-power-
plan/?utm_term=.f24e392966b0. 
166. See generally Joint Reply of West Virginia, et al., Oklahoma, et al., North Dakota, 
and Mississippi DEQ in Support of Motions for Stay & For Expedited Consideration, W. Va. v. 
EPA, USCA Case No. 15-1363 (Dec. 23, 2015). 
167. Id.  
168. See Office of the Press Secretary, The White House, Power Sector Carbon Pollu-
tion Standards, Memorandum for the Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency 
(June 25, 2013), http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2013/06/25/presidential-memo-
randum-power-sector-carbon-pollution-standards; see also Massachusetts, 549 U.S. 497, 532 
(2007); see also Util. Air Regulatory Group v. EPA, 134 S. Ct. 2427 (2014). 
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Plan is so expansive it will inevitably transform the electricity sec-
tor,169 the Supreme Court has taken note of this through its deci-
sion to stay the Plan and is also concerned about the vast impact 
of the Plan in action.170 Thus, it is necessary and imperative to con-
sider a potential alternative solution the EPA could promulgate if 
the Supreme Court invalidates the rule. 
A. A World with the Clean Power Plan 
The EPA appears to be within its regulatory bounds in its cur-
rent promulgation of the Clean Power Plan. By establishing state 
specific guidelines and standards of performance for existing sta-
tionary electricity generating facilities, under section 111 of the 
Clean Air Act, the EPA is simply providing a backdrop of require-
ments and recommendations that the states need to consider in 
developing their state implementation plans.171 
Although the EPA sets out three specific building block strat-
egies that the states can choose from while establishing their state 
plans, this list is not exhaustive.172 Nor is it a hard–line set of re-
quirements that the states are obligated to choose from.173 The EPA 
primarily utilized these three emission reduction methods as a 
guide to illustrate adequately demonstrated measures.174 There-
fore, the states have flexibility in choosing whatever emission re-
duction methods they desire when developing their state plans so 
long as they can show a satisfactory attempt to achieve their state 
specific emission reduction targets.175 
                                                          
169. See Util. Air Regulatory Group, 134 S. Ct. at 2437–38 (an agency cannot exercise 
significant and transformative power unless it has clear congressional authorization). 
170. Id. 
171. See 42 U.S.C §7411(d)(1); 40 C.F.R. §60.23–.24; see also Carbon Pollution Emis-
sion Guidelines for Existing Stationary Sources: Electric Utility Generating Units, 80 Fed. 
Reg. at 64,662, 64,667.  
172. See generally Carbon Pollution Emission Guidelines for Existing Stationary 
Sources: Electric Utility Generating Units, 80 Fed. Reg. at 64,667–69, 64,966.  
173. See id. at 64,710. 
174. See id. at 64,709. 
175. Id.  
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Thus, although the states may feel as though their regulatory 
territory is being intruded upon, it is ultimately their choice 
whether or not they let the EPA micromanage their energy re-
source choices or they regulate it themselves in a manner that com-
plies with the EPA’s emission reduction goals.176 The states gener-
ally have a sufficient amount of flexibility in deciding how to com-
ply and achieve their emission reduction targets. For example, be-
sides the three building block strategies set out by the EPA in the 
Clean Power Plan, states can achieve their emission reduction tar-
gets through promoting energy efficiency measures or demand re-
sponse energy efficiency programs,177 or by participating in an 
emissions trading program by selling or purchasing credits178 from 
other states.179 Since twenty-nine states have well established re-
                                                          
176. As previously mentioned, if states do not choose to submit a plan that is satisfac-
tory to the EPA or they elect not to submit a plan at all, the EPA will initiate a federal imple-
mentation plan for the state. However, even if a state has a federal implementation plan ap-
plied to it, the state still has the option to go back to the drawing board and develop a state 
plan to submit to the EPA. See Carbon Pollution Emission Guidelines for Existing Stationary 
Sources: Electric Utility Generating Units, 80 Fed. Reg. at 64, 669, 64, 947; see also 42 U.S.C. 
§7411(d)(2). 
177. Energy efficiency programs are promulgated to reduce energy used by specific 
end-use devices and systems without affecting the services provided, like energy efficient light 
bulbs, heat recovery systems, and efficient heat pumps. See Definition of Energy Efficiency, 
Electricity, U.S. ENERGY INFORMATION ADMINISTRATION, http://www.eia.gov/tools/glossary/in-
dex.cfm (select the letter “E” within the search form; then scroll down to “Energy Efficiency, 
Electricity”). Whereas demand response programs are incentive based programs encouraging 
electric power consumers to temporarily reduce their demand for power at certain times of the 
day in exchange for a reduction in their electric bills. Definition of Demand Response Pro-
grams, U.S. ENERGY INFORMATION ADMINISTRATION, http://www.eia.gov/tools/glossary/in-
dex.cfm (select the letter “D” within the search form; then scroll down to “Demand Response 
Programs”). Both of these options aid in lowering carbon dioxide emissions through reductions 
in energy consumption. See id. 
178. Credits are determined based on the amount of emission reductions that can be 
achieved through methods that shift energy generation to lower emitting resources, like gas 
burning power plants or renewable energy power plants, or methods that generally reduce 
energy demand. See e.g., Memorandum from Brian McLean, Office of Atmospheric Programs, 
to the Regional Air Division Directors (Aug. 5, 2004) (example of credit determinations and 
formulas for state implementation plans utilizing renewable energy and energy efficiency 
measures). 
179. See Carbon Pollution Emission Guidelines for Existing Stationary Sources: Elec-
tric Utility Generating Units, 79 Fed. Reg. 34,927 (June 18, 2014) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. 
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newable portfolio standards and eight states have renewable port-
folio goals, there is a very high chance that states will have the 
ability to utilize market-based trading programs, like cap and 
trade.180 This will help states that, while developing their compli-
ance plans, cannot necessarily switch to lower emitting electric 
generating facilities easily or within the near future.181 As a result, 
despite these indirectly intrusive attempts at regulating carbon di-
oxide emissions through regulating stationary electricity generat-
ing facilities, the states still have the flexibility and freedom to 
choose how they will comply with their state emission targets. 
Therefore, to reach a well-suited compromise that allows the 
EPA to regulate carbon dioxide emissions emitted from electricity 
generating facilities but also allows the states to continue main-
taining their authority to choose what electricity generation facili-
ties produce energy within their geographical bounds, it is imper-
ative that the EPA’s regulation provides standards with which 
states have the freedom to comply. Section 111 of the Clean Air Act 
requires that the EPA promulgate standards based on the best 
methods of emission reductions taking into consideration 
measures that are adequately demonstrated, which it has done in 
                                                          
pt. 60); see also Carbon Pollution Emission Guidelines for Existing Stationary Sources: Electric 
Utility Generating Units, 80 Fed. Reg. at 64,709, 64,834–37. 
180. DSIRE & U.S. DEPT. OF ENERGY, Renewable Portfolio Standard Policies (Aug. 
2016), http://ncsolarcen-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/11/Renewable-
Portfolio-Standards.pdf. For example, although Idaho does not have a renewable portfolio 
standard policy, its neighboring states Washington, Oregon, Montana, and Nevada have these 
policies which could aid Idaho if it had the need to buy or sell emission credits from or to any 
of these states that are encouraging renewable energy development. See id. 
181. States allege that shifting energy generation will be burdensome due to stranded 
costs, and not being able to take full advantage of the useful life of fossil fueled power plants. 
With an emission credit trading system, these states could take advantage of the opportunity 
to buy credits from states that have the capability to shift to lower emitting or zero emitting 
electric power plants while using their fossil fueled power plants. See Fact Sheet: Clean Power 
Plan, The Role of States- States Decide How They Will Cut Carbon Pollution, EPA, 
http://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2014-05/documents/20140602fs-states-role.pdf. (last 
updated May 11, 2015). However, if these stranded costs of investments made years ago for 
fossil fuel burning facilities are abandoned or incorporated into other costs of shifting electric-
ity generation, electricity customers’ rates will likely be negatively impacted. See generally 
Commissioner Tony Clark Statement, Environmental Protection Agency 111(d) Regulations, 
FED. ENERGY REG. COMM’N (Aug. 3, 2015), http://www.ferc.gov/media/statements-
speeches/clark/2015/08-03-15-clark.asp#.VrAoFNDFvid.  
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its Clean Power Plan.182 However, by its emphasis on the three 
building block strategies, it appears that the states take the EPA’s 
approach as a direct requirement or instruction that they must uti-
lize such building blocks to be in compliance with the Act. Since 
this is not necessarily the case, due to the flexibility provided by 
the Plan, the EPA should have made it clear in their regulation 
that the states are still able to retain authority and discretion in 
their energy generator diversity. For example, with the flexibility 
inherent in the Plan and its current and future opportunities to 
expand potential carbon dioxide emission reductions, Idaho is an 
exemplary state to evaluate with the Plan’s primary goal of reduc-
ing emissions in mind. 
1. Idaho’s Victory in Reducing Emissions 
With or without the Clean Power Plan, Idaho will still likely 
meet, and potentially go beyond, its emission reduction goals set 
out by the EPA with its unique electricity generation portfolio, and 
its future trajectory trends and opportunities. According to the 
EPA’s estimates, Idaho’s 2012 historic level of carbon dioxide emis-
sion rate is 858 pounds per megawatt hour.183 In the Plan, Idaho’s 
final goal for 2030 and beyond is 771 pounds per megawatt hour.184 
The EPA projects that even without the Plan, Idaho could reduce 
its carbon dioxide emissions down to 766 pounds per megawatt 
hour.185 
For a typical red state, Idaho is unique in that its readily avail-
able energy resources are very green. Although Idaho does not 
have a renewable portfolio standard program or goal, it does not 
necessarily need one due to its high reliance on renewable energy 
resources. Overall, the balance of Idaho’s net electricity generation 
                                                          
182. See 42 U.S.C. § 7411(d)(1) (1990); see also 40 C.F.R. §§ 60.23–24 (1995).  
183. Clean Power Plan: State at a Glance: Idaho EPA, (Aug. 3, 2015), 
https://www3.epa.gov/airquality/cpptoolbox/idaho.pdf. 
184. See id. 
185. See id. 
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is supplied by hydropower, wind, natural gas, biomass, geother-
mal, and coal fired generation.186 In 2014, 82 percent of Idaho’s net 
electricity generation came from renewable energy resources.187 
Hydroelectric power alone supplied 60 percent of Idaho’s net elec-
tricity generation while its wind generation capability increased by 
13 percent and provided 18 percent of its net electricity genera-
tion.188  
Although these statistics illustrate that Idaho is an environ-
mentally friendly and self-sufficient electricity generating state, 
Idaho does import approximately 35 percent of its electricity from 
neighboring states.189 This is primarily because Idaho has no coal-
fired power plants within its borders and is beginning to develop 
natural gas; currently most of its natural gas supply is piped into 
the state from its neighboring states and Canada.190 
In a preexisting effort to reduce carbon dioxide emissions and 
reliance on coal power, Idaho has planned to reduce its coal fired 
electricity generation consumption by shutting down the coal 
power plants it co-owns in other states. For example, Idaho Power 
owns half of the North Valmy coal fired power plant and typically 
receives half of the plant’s electricity generation.191 Both Idaho 
Power and North Valmy Energy, the other co-owner of the plant, 
have agreed to decommission the plant by the end of 2025.192 Idaho 
                                                          
186. See id. 
187. See U.S. Energy Information Administration, supra note 142. Idaho typically is 
among the top ten states for renewable energy production, usually found between either the 
top ranked to the fifth top ranked positions depending on the factors considered in a study or 
analysis. See id.; see also How Green Is Your State? OLIVET NAZARENE UNIVERSITY (Nov. 5, 
2015), http://graduate.olivet.edu/news-events/news/how-green-your-state. 
188. See U.S. Energy Information Administration, supra note 142. 
189. See id.; see also IDAHO STRATEGIC ENERGY ALLIANCE, IDAHO ENERGY PRIMER 
2015 at 9, 35 (2015).  
190. See U.S. Energy Information Administration, supra note 142. 
191. Ken Miller, Idaho Power’s 2015 IRP Nears Completion, SNAKE RIVER ALLIANCE 
(June 22, 2015), http://snakeriveralliance.org/idaho-powers-2015-irp-nears-completion/; see 
generally NV Energy, North Valmy Generating Station, NV ENERGY INC., https://www.nven-
ergy.com/company/energytopics/images/Valmy_Fact_Sheet.pdf (last updated April 2015) 
(North Valmy plant description). 
192. Ken Miller, Idaho Power’s 2015 IRP Nears Completion, SNAKE RIVER ALLIANCE 
(June 22, 2015), http://snakeriveralliance.org/idaho-powers-2015-irp-nears-completion/.  
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Power and Portland General Electric co-own the Boardman coal 
fired power plant and also plan to decommission the plant by the 
end of 2020.193 Both of these coal-fired power plants shutting down 
in the future would amount to at least 525 megawatts of high emit-
ting power displaced.194 With a trajectory of Idaho power compa-
nies and the utilities investing in more renewable energy systems 
and energy efficiency programs,195 which would reduce energy con-
sumption and replace the heavy emitting energy supplies with low 
to zero emitting energy supplies, Idaho is on track to meet its citi-
zens’ energy demands while further reducing carbon dioxide emis-
sions. Therefore, Idaho is on a great path, with its diverse electric-
ity generation capabilities, to meet and even go beyond emissions 
reductions recommended by the EPA. Many other states could take 
note of Idaho’s trajectory and investment strategies to gauge 
whether they are along a similar path of carbon dioxide emission 
reductions without the EPA’s regulatory oversight through a fed-
erally implemented state plan. 
2. The Downfall of Noncompliant States: A Push in the Right 
Direction 
The EPA’s Clean Power Plan does offer an option for those 
states that initially choose to be stubborn and non-compliant. The 
Plan provides that if states choose to decline to prepare and submit 
their own compliance plans to reduce carbon dioxide emissions, 
then the EPA will promulgate a federal plan for the affected power 
                                                          
193. See Ted Sickinger, PGE Plan to Close Coal-Fired Boardman Power Plant by 2020 
Could Set National Precedent, THE OREGONIAN (Dec. 6, 2010), http://www.oregonlive.com/en-
vironment/index.ssf/2010/12/pge_plan_to_close_coal-fired_b.html. 
194. Miller, supra note 192 (shutting down both coal fired power plants, North Valmy 
and Boardman which Idaho utilizes 260 megawatts and 275 megawatts from respectively, 
would add up to 535 megawatts of heavy emitting energy displaced).  
195. See id. (this ultimately results in a win-win scenario for both utilities, power com-
panies, and electricity consumers); see also IDAHO STRATEGIC ENERGY ALLIANCE, supra note 
189, at 24–31, 35 (Idaho’s investments in both renewable energy system development and in-
tegration, and energy efficiency programs help create jobs, reduce energy consumption, in-
crease profits for both end use consumers and power companies, and reduce carbon dioxide 
emissions);  
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plants in that state.196 However, the EPA does not have authority 
to impose sanctions on a state for failing to submit a plan.197 There-
fore, unless the states view the EPA’s federal oversight over their 
electricity generating facilities that emit carbon dioxide to be a 
punishment in of itself, it appears as though the states are not fac-
ing any harsh punishments for failing to comply, like a hefty fine. 
The states also have the option to work with the EPA and imple-
ment certain aspects of the Plan themselves while leaving other 
aspects to the EPA to implement.198 Also, the states that fail to 
comply with the Plan and find that they do not favor the EPA over-
seeing their affected power plants, have the option to prepare and 
adopt a state plan, which the EPA would have to approve, that 
could supplant the federal plan implemented by the EPA.199 There-
fore, a state could choose to be stubborn by not complying with the 
Plan and face no EPA imposed sanctions, but it will have to face a 
federally implemented plan created by the EPA or choose to step 
up and supplant it with a state plan of its own. 
As a result, despite the states’ frustrations with the perceived 
flexibility of the Clean Power Plan and their argument that the 
Plan is an unnecessary intrusion into their authoritative bounds 
in energy regulation, the EPA is not commandeering their author-
ity to choose which electricity power plants to turn on and off. The 
states still maintain this choice despite the EPA’s regulatory influ-
ence. The EPA’s authority is essentially peppered with state regu-
latory authority to decide which electricity-generating facilities to 
use while ensuring that they are reducing carbon dioxide emissions 
and preventing the potential continuance of public and environ-
mental neglect. Through the Plan, the EPA is attempting to prom-
ulgate a traditional cooperative federalism program with the pur-
pose and goal of benefiting the greater good. Whether or not the 
states agree with how they individually get to that result— by co-
operating with the EPA or running their own electricity regime in 
light of the carbon dioxide standards—is that states’ own problem. 
In addition, with or without the Clean Power Plan in place, the 
EPA could choose to implement a progressive region by region mar-
ket based emissions cap system, like the Region Greenhouse Gas 
                                                          
196. See Carbon Pollution Emission Guidelines for Existing Stationary Sources: Elec-
tric Utility Generating Units, 80 Fed. Reg. at 64,942, 64,987–88 (Oct. 23, 2015).  
197. See id. at 64,942. 
198. See id. 
199. See id. 
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Initiative, that could provide the states with flexibility and benefits 
in meeting emission reductions. In the end, the EPA is just func-
tioning as the regulatory parent the states sometimes need, despite 
their denial, so that states can continue to use their sovereign au-
thority and power to ensure the peoples’ health and welfare. 
B. A World Without the Clean Power Plan: A Compromise 
Through Regional Market-Based Program 
Given the Supreme Court’s bold move in staying the Clean 
Power Plan, and the potential for the Court to find that the EPA is 
taking too big of a step without a clear congressional directive that 
justifies or guides its actions, it is necessary to consider the world 
without the Plan in action. Even without the Plan in effect, the 
states’ ongoing trends provide reason to be optimistic about the 
overall goal of reducing carbon dioxide emissions.200 Numerous 
power companies and utilities have expected some form of govern-
mental climate action for years now and have already made, and 
are continuing to make, efforts to get ahead of the curve by increas-
ing their natural gas capacity, constructing and integrating more 
renewable energy generation facilities, and retiring coal power 
plants.201 
This ongoing trend is dynamically changing the electricity sec-
tor’s generation portfolio, and benefiting the environment and pub-
lic welfare by reducing carbon dioxide emissions. This movement 
can be primarily attributed to two factors: reduced costs in invest-
ing in renewable energy systems, like solar and wind, and low nat-
ural gas prices.202 Thus far, looking at the sector’s ongoing progress 
                                                          
200. See generally Inst. for Elec. Innovation, Thought Leaders Speak Out: Key Trends 
Driving Change in the Electric Power Industry, EDISON FOUNDATION (Dec. 2015), 
http://www.edisonfoundation.net/iei/Documents/IEI_KeyTrendsDrivingChange_FINAL.pdf.  
201. See Gavin Bade, Will the Clean Power Plan Actually Change Anything in the 
Power Sector?, UTILITYDIVE (Aug. 7, 2015), http://www.utilitydive.com/news/will-the-clean-
power-plan-actually-change-anything-in-the-power-sector/403639/.  
202. See Michael Grunwald, Hidden in Obama’s New Climate Plan, A Whack at Red 
States, POLITICO (Aug. 4, 2015), http://www.politico.com/agenda/story/2015/08/hidden-in-
obamas-new-climate-plan-a-whack-at-red-states-000188; see also Robert Walton, EEI: Utili-
ties Moving from Coal, Toward Gas & Renewables Regardless of CPP Stay, UTILITYDIVE (Feb. 
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with these trends in mind, utilities have made investments in nat-
ural gas and renewable energy generating systems that, “have cut 
carbon dioxide emissions 15-percent below 2005 levels” already.203 
With natural gas prices as low as they are, utilities and power com-
panies are encouraged to invest in natural gas fired electricity gen-
eration and construct more natural gas pipeline infrastructure.204 
Since both the Production Tax Credit and the Investment Tax 
Credit have been extended through 2021 by Congress, wind and 
solar development are continuing to boom.205 The wind industry is 
thriving not only because of the Production Tax Credit, but also 
because wind’s installation costs have decreased by nearly 66 per-
cent since 2009.206 
In addition, and as previously mentioned, twenty-nine states 
already have and are implementing renewable portfolio standard 
programs which are further incentivizing renewable energy devel-
opment and integration.207 Along with these standards and goals, 
states have also developed initiatives with energy efficiency pro-
grams that aim at reducing energy consumption, further reducing 
potential carbon dioxide emissions.208 For example, in the Pacific 
Northwest region, the Northwest Power and Conservation Council 
                                                          
12, 2016), http://www.utilitydive.com/news/eei-utilities-moving-from-coal-toward-gas-renewa-
bles-regardless-of-cpp/413822/. 
203. EEI to Wall Street: The Promise of Tomorrow, EDISON ELECTRIC INSTITUTE (Feb. 
10, 2016), http://www.eei.org/resourcesandmedia/newsroom/Pages/Press%20Re-
leases/EEI%20to%20Wall%20Street%20The%20Promise%20of%20Tomorrow.aspx (state-
ment made by Tom Kuhn). 
204. See Robert Walton, Why the Supreme Court Stay on The Clean Power Plan ‘Means 
Nothing’ for Efficiency, UTILITYDIVE (Feb. 17, 2016), http://www.utilitydive.com/news/why-
the-supreme-court-stay-on-the-clean-power-plan-means-nothing-for-effi/414000/. 
205. See Herman K. Trabish, Powered by PTC, Wind Energy Expected to Keep Boom-
ing Despite Clean Power Plan Stay, UTILITYDIVE (Feb. 17, 2016), http://www.utili-
tydive.com/news/powered-by-ptc-wind-energy-expected-to-keep-booming-despite-clean-
power-pl/413443/ (demand for cheap wind may be so great that utilities build out enough to 
meet CPP targets regardless of stay). 
206. See Officials Highlight Need for Stable Policy to Continue Growing Wind Energy, 
AMERICAN WIND ENERGY ASSOCIATION (Aug. 10, 2015), http://www.awea.org/MediaCen-
ter/pressrelease.aspx?ItemNumber=7787. 
207. See generally DSIRE & U.S. DEPT. OF ENERGY, supra note 180. 
208. See Walton, supra note 204. 
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has estimated that the region could meet twenty years’ worth of 
demand growth through energy-efficient measures.209 In fact, the 
Pacific Northwest’s regional energy load has only grown by an av-
erage of 0.4 percent annually due to investments in energy effi-
ciency.210 Thus, in a business as usual situation, as we currently 
have now with the stay on the Plan, it is apparent that numerous 
states have taken the initiative to transform their energy genera-
tion portfolios and reduce carbon dioxide emissions from the elec-
tricity sector. However, even with this progress there are certain 
states that could use some work or a push through guidance or reg-
ulation to reduce carbon dioxide emissions.211 Therefore, the EPA 
should consider other options, like regional market-based emission 
cap programs, that would be more effective for these stubborn 
high-emitting states. 
The EPA should take an approach that would primarily rely 
on the market and the states themselves, while retaining some 
oversight, to reduce carbon dioxide emissions while transforming 
the electricity sector in ways the states see fit. This could be done 
by incorporating the ideals and lessons learned from the Regional 
Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI) program, a cap and trade pro-
gram initiated by ten states in 2009, and transforming it into a 
regional program throughout the country.212 Similar to the RGGI 
                                                          
209. See Carol Winkel, Northwest Power Plan Supports Growth While Preserving Nat-
ural Resources: Improved energy efficiency, demand response, and natural gas generation are 
primary means to ensuring a reliable and economical power supply, NW. POWER AND 
CONSERVATION COUNCIL (Feb. 10, 2016), https://www.nwcouncil.org/news/blog/7th-pp-ap-
proved/?mkt_tok=3RkMMJWWfF9wsRogua3Kd%2B%2FhmjTEU5z17Ow-
pUKSylMI%2F0ER3fOvrPUfGjI4FS8ZhMq%2BTFAwTG5toziV8R7DNLM1wy8YQWhPh; 
see also Seventh Power Plan, NW. POWER AND CONSERVATION COUNCIL, (Feb. 25, 2016), 
http://www.nwcouncil.org/energy/powerplan/7/plan/. 
210. Winkel, supra note 209. 
211. See generally Application by 29 States & State Agencies for Immediate Stay of 
Final Agency Acion During Pendency of Petitions for Review, West Virginia et al. v. EPA, No. 
16- (U.S. Jan. 26, 2016) (generally, the states that are challenging the rule are typically higher 
emitting states, like West Virginia, Texas, and Arkansas).  
212. See generally PAUL J. HIBBARD, SUSAN F. TIERNEY, ANDREA M. OKIE, PAVEL G. 
DARLING, THE ECONOMIC IMPACTS OF THE REGIONAL GREENHOUSE GAS INITIATIVE ON TEN 
NORTHEAST AND MID-ATLANTIC STATES, ANALYSIS GROUP (Nov. 15, 2011), https://lmscon-
tent.embanet.com/VLS/ENV5226/Module6/EconomicImpactRGGIReport.pdf. 
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program set up, the EPA could establish regional programs 
throughout the country with set carbon dioxide emission caps for 
every region. This way states could dynamically work together to 
achieve these emission caps more efficiently by pooling sources to-
gether and looking at emissions with a regional perspective. 
Within each designated regional program area, the EPA could 
evaluate the current and projected carbon dioxide emission levels 
for the region, which the EPA has already done on a state by state 
level for the Clean Power Plan, and establish set emission caps 
that the states have to be within by a final deadline, which the EPA 
can set up. Then, after the EPA evaluates whether it would be 
more efficient to set up interim deadlines of every two or three 
years, the states could evaluate their current electricity-generating 
facilities and emission levels so that they could then buy carbon 
dioxide emission allowances.213 
This market-based system, modeled after the RGGI program, 
is similar to the already successful market-based system estab-
lished by the EPA for nitrogen oxides and sulfur dioxide emissions, 
except that allowances would be purchased at a market-set price.214 
Putting a set cost on the emissions allowances is beneficial partic-
ularly in electricity markets because these costs can easily be 
rolled into the competitive wholesale markets for electricity or rate 
cases set by utilities.215 These costs help reflect the costs of emitting 
carbon dioxide, while sending signals to market participants 
which, over time, could further encourage industries and power 
companies to invest in efficiency initiatives, renewable energy re-
sources, or change operations to overall reduce carbon dioxide 
emissions.216 
The unique concept about the RGGI program, in comparison 
to other market-based schemes, is that the money spent by power 
generators to buy allowances, to comply with their emissions, gets 
funneled back to their respective state governments where the 
                                                          
213. See id. at 9 (at the end of interim deadlines, or generally deadlines set up within 
the program, the electric generating facilities must have obtained allowances equal to its car-
bon dioxide emissions).  
214. See id. 
215. See id. at 10. 
216. See id. 
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state is free to spend the funds as it pleases.217 Most of the states 
in the original RGGI program typically invested half of their funds 
into energy efficiency programs, which reduced energy consump-
tion and carbon dioxide emissions while creating numerous jobs 
throughout the region.218 This is a win-win scenario for the states 
since they are allowed to use these funds in various programs that 
may not involve the electricity sector.219 For example, within the 
first three years of the RGGI’s implementation, the RGGI produced 
an approximate economic benefit of $1.6 billion, increased job years 
by approximate 16,000, and reduced payments to out of region pro-
viders of fossil fuels by a little over $765 million.220 Although the 
RGGI program had some minor issues due to the set cap level’s 
inadequacy, the EPA could prevent these issues, as well as others, 
by creating a program or regional group that consistently monitors 
emissions and emission reduction progress to assess whether caps 
need to be changed if regions are more effective than others.221 
The main benefits of the EPA implementing a regional market 
based emissions cap program for carbon dioxide emissions, like the 
RGGI program, is that it has already been done and proven suc-
cessful, given some minor fixes and changes, and it provides the 
states with compensational benefits for their efforts in mitigating 
carbon dioxide emissions and transforming their energy genera-
tion portfolios.222 West Virginia is a good example of a state that 
                                                          
217. See id. 
218. See HIBBARD ET. AL., supra note 212, at 33–37; see also LUCAS BIFERA, CENTER 
FOR CLIMATE AND ENERGY SOLUTIONS, REGIONAL GREENHOUSE GAS INITIATIVE (RGGI), (Dec. 
2013), http://www.c2es.org/docUploads/rggi-brief-12-18-13-updated.pdf. 
219. For example, some states invested funds into educational programs and into the 
state government itself to reduce deficits or create jobs. See HIBBARD ET. AL., supra note 212, 
at 20. 
220. See id. at 36.  
221. See Mark Febrizio, RGGI: A Faulty Model for “Successful” Cap-and-Trade, 
INSTITUTE FOR ENERGY RESOURCE (Dec. 15, 2015), http://instituteforenergyresearch.org/anal-
ysis/rggi-a-faulty-model-for-successful-cap-and-trade/. 
222. See HIBBARD ET. AL., supra note 212, at 36, 43–48. 
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needs this kind of help in reducing emissions and diversifying its 
energy portfolio. 
West Virginia’s net electricity generation in 2015 was com-
prised of coal fired power plants, about 94 percent specifically, with 
renewable energy resources contributing about 3.7 percent.223 With 
the state producing more electricity than it consumes, exporting 
about three-fourths of the coal it mines to other states,224 and coal 
reliance declining generally throughout the country, West Virginia 
has the potential to drastically transform its electricity sector to 
become more diverse. With a regional carbon emission cap market 
scheme in place, all of those coal fired power plant generators 
would have to buy allowances for every short ton of emissions they 
emit, which would create extra costs that would roll into consumer 
electricity rates. These higher rates for coal powered electricity 
would instigate customers and market participants to buy less of 
these electricity services, which would then cause a reduction in 
electricity production by coal-fired power plants.225 Meanwhile, the 
funds generated from the purchase of emission allowances would 
go to the state where the state could take and divvy up the funds 
to invest in natural gas powered electricity development, energy 
efficiency measures, renewable energy resources, and any other ar-
eas of investment that the state deems necessary. 
Over time, as the state fluctuates from its original heavy reli-
ance on coal and coal-fired power plants to diversifying its electric-
ity generation resources through its compliance with the regional 
cap market scheme, the state will aid in the overall effort to reduce 
carbon dioxide emissions while being compensating for its efforts. 
Especially because the cap periodically lowers to further reduce 
overall regional carbon dioxide emissions, this would further insti-
gate the state to use the funds, generated by the emission allow-
ance proceeds, for investments in energy measures that would re-
duce carbon dioxide emissions while creating jobs and boosting the 
state’s economy. Therefore, although West Virginia would need to 
change its electricity generation resource portfolio, if it does so 
wisely by using the state funds generated through the regional 
                                                          
223. West Virginia State Profile and Energy Estimates, U.S. ENERGY INFORMATION 
ADMINISTRATION, (last updated July 21, 2016), http://www.eia.gov/state/analysis.cfm?sid=WV. 
224. See id. 
225. See HIBBARD ET. AL., supra note 212, at 33–35.  
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market based emissions cap program, the state would produce 
enough electricity to meet its consumers’ and citizens’ needs and 
successfully reduce carbon dioxide emissions. 
In the end, the EPA is within its regulatory bounds in prom-
ulgating carbon dioxide emission reduction goals within the Clean 
Power plan, but given that the Plan is expansive and extremely 
significant, which is further highlighted by the Supreme Court’s 
unusual move in staying the Plan’s promulgation,226 the Court may 
disagree with the EPA’s vast endeavor of regulating carbon dioxide 
emissions in the Plan and invalidate it. If this were to happen, the 
EPA should utilize all of its research and data on state specific 
emission goals and start developing a rule that would create re-
gional market based programs that aim at encouraging the reduc-
tion of carbon dioxide emissions while boosting state economies. 
This approach would essentially provide a win-win for the states 
and the EPA while also benefiting the environment by mitigating 
future climate change impacts. As stated by an EPA representa-
tive, after the Supreme Court issued its stay on the Plan, “you can’t 
stay climate change and you can’t stay climate action.”227 There-
fore, one way or another, the EPA will find a way to initiate and 
pursue progressive action in the face of climate change and lead 
this country towards a healthier and brighter future. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
This country can no longer deny the consequences of its ac-
tions. It cannot continue emitting harsh pollutants into the air just 
because the fuel supplies are cheap and come from long-utilized 
sources. The United States has come so far in environmental reg-
ulation, protecting human health, and conserving natural re-
sources. It cannot take a step backward now. 
Some states may want to maintain the status quo, but the lon-
gevity of that option is limited. Human actions have caused too 
                                                          
226. See generally Emily Holden, Elizabeth Harball, & Ellen M. Gilmer, SCOTUS 
halts Clean Power Plan, stuns states planning carbon cuts, E&E PUBLISHING (Feb. 10, 2016), 
http://www.eenews.net/stories/1060032137.  
227. See id. (statement from Melissa Harrison, EPA Press Secretary). 
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many environmental disasters to stay on that path for long. Alt-
hough the states would like the ultimate freedom to choose what 
electricity-generating plants they use, they must consider their cit-
izens’ health and welfare at the same time. 
Despite the desire to operate efficient and cheap power plants, 
those harmful facilities are actually holding the states back from 
meeting their responsibilities. Climate change poses a “monumen-
tal threat” to the prosperity of the greatest number for the longest 
time.228 By working together to reduce carbon dioxide emissions 
and mitigate climate change, the states and the EPA can best serve 
the people. To ensure the greatest good for future generations, so-
ciety must take responsibility for its actions—starting now. 
 
                                                          
228. Respondent EPA’s Opposition to Motions to Stay Final Rule at 1, West Virgina. 
v. EPA, No. 15-1363 (D.C. Cir. Dec. 3, 2015) (noting that climate change poses a “monumental 
threat to Americans’ health and welfare by causing [enduring] changes in [the] climate, result-
ing in an array of severe negative effects, including drought, disease, increasing weather 
events, and rising sea levels”); see also PINCHOT, supra note 1. 
   
